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1 Introduction
Many economic and social interactions are repeated: the same buyers and sellers often
trade with one another multiple times, teams of contractors regularly work for the same
procurement agencies, voters repeatedly elect representatives, to name just a few. The
central theme of this paper is the design of institutions, or contractual arrangements,
that generate “socially desirable” outcomes in settings where agents repeatedly interact
and preferences change over time.
To illustrate the type of economic problems this paper addresses, consider for ex-
ample the situation in which a buyer and a seller interact more than once. Are there
contractual arrangements that (in all equilibria) allow the seller to extract all the sur-
plus from trade? As another example, consider the case in which two (or more) agents
may work on a number of tasks that are profitable to a principal. Can we design
arrangements that (again, in all equilibria) induce the agents to work on the most
profitable tasks at each point in time, even if it is costly to them? In all these prob-
lems, an essential difficulty is the multiplicity of equilibria, including “undesirable”
equilibria, that repeated interactions make possible to sustain. The aim of the paper is
to characterize the social outcomes that are implementable; that is, those outcomes for
which there exist contractual arrangements that only yield equilibria consistent with
them.
More formally, we study the problem of repeated, full, implementation of social
choice functions in environments with complete information and a changing state of
the world. A social choice function is repeatedly implementable in Nash equilibrium if
there exists a sequence of (possibly history-dependent) mechanisms such that for any
period, for any profile of preferences at that period, the set of equilibrium outcomes
corresponds to the social choice function at that profile of preferences.
Full implementation in a static environment (i.e., with a single period) has been
extensively studied.1 The seminal contribution is Maskin (1999), which states that
Maskin monotonicity is necessary and almost sufficient for full implementation. In this
1See Jackson (2001), Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002), and Serrano (2004) for recent surveys on im-
plementation theory.
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paper, we provide a condition, called dynamic monotonicity, and show that it is nec-
essary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether
the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is “large” or “small.”
Dynamic monotonicity is a natural but non-trivial dynamic extension of Maskin
monotonicity. It reduces to Maskin monotonicity in single-period settings, but is weaker
in all other finitely repeated implementation problems. Thus, perhaps surprisingly,
finitely repeated implementation is “easier” to achieve than single-shot implementation.
For example, while full-surplus extraction by a seller cannot be implemented in a static
problem, it can if there are at least two periods in which the buyer and the seller interact
(see Example 1 in Section 3).
We also show that in infinitely repeated problems with patient enough agents,
dynamic monotonicity implies that the social choice function is weakly efficient from
the agents’ point of view. However, no efficiency condition is necessary in infinitely
repeated problems with impatient enough agents and in all finitely repeated problems.
For example, collusion among agents in a team can be deterred in all finite horizon
problems and in infinite horizon problems with impatient enough agents (see Example
2 in Section 3).
In a repeated implementation problem, the designer’s choice of a mechanism in
each period may depend on the agents’ actions and mechanisms in all previous pe-
riods; agents need not be playing the same stage game in each period. Intuitively,
contractual arrangements may be used to compensate an agent when he deviates be-
fore period t from a collusive strategy profile that would induce socially undesirable
outcomes from period t onwards. This possibility of inducing preemptive deviations
from future collusion facilitates implementation and is the reason why finitely repeated
implementation is easier than static implementation. Indeed, it is only when the hori-
zon is infinite and the discount factor is close to one that the gain from a future collusive
agreement dominates any preemptive punishment and only outcomes that are efficient
for the agents can be implemented. This insight is at the heart of Lee and Sabourian
(2011) work on infinitely repeated implementation problems (to be discussed shortly).
Unlike the literature on dynamic mechanism design, which has recently seen a flurry
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of papers (e.g., see the survey by Bergemann and Said, 2011), the literature on full
implementation in dynamic environments is in its infancy. Two papers have studied
repeated setting where, unlike in this paper, the state of the world does not change over
time. Kalai and Ledyard (1998) study infinitely repeated implementation in dominant
strategies; they show that every social choice function can be repeatedly implemented
starting from some (possibly distant) point in the future. Chambers (2004) studies
virtual repeated Nash implementation in continuous time.
In an important recent paper, Lee and Sabourian (2011) consider environments in
which, like in our paper, the state of the world changes over time.2 Unlike us, they focus
on infinitely repeated settings with patient agents; that is, agents with a discount factor
arbitrarily close to one. Their main result is that weak efficiency of the social choice
function relative to any other function with an equal or smaller range is necessary for
infinitely repeated implementation. Under some mild additional assumptions on the
environment, they also show that if the discount factor is larger than 1/2, then strict
efficiency in the range is sufficient for infinitely repeated implementation from period
two onwards (but the designer may fail to implement the correct outcome in the first
period).
Maskin monotonicity and weak efficiency in the range are very different conditions,
and thus it is perhaps a puzzle that the first is necessary and almost sufficient in the
static case and the second is necessary and almost sufficient in the polar case of infinite
interactions with patient enough agents. In this paper we solve this puzzle, by intro-
ducing the condition of dynamic monotonicity and showing that it is necessary and
almost sufficient in all repeated implementation problems, including the so-far unex-
plored, but clearly empirically important, case of a finite number of interactions and the
case of infinitely repeated interactions with general discount factors. In the static case,
dynamic monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity. In infinitely repeated
problems with an arbitrarily high enough discount factor, dynamic monotonicity is es-
sentially equivalent to weak efficiency in the range. As we illustrate in Examples 1 and
2See also Renou and Tomala (2015) and Lee and Sabourian (2013) for the problem of approximate
implementation in environments with incomplete information.
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2, neither Maskin monotonicity nor an efficiency condition are necessary for repeated
implementation in general.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the problem of repeated im-
plementation. Section 3 presents two examples motivating our investigation. Section 4
introduces the condition of dynamic monotonicity. Section 5 presents the main results
of the paper. Section 6 provides some extensions of our results and Section 7 concludes.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Definitions
Single-shot Implementation. A static or single-shot implementation problem P is
a tuple 〈I, X,Θ, (ui)i∈I〉, where I = {1, . . . , I} is a set of I agents, X is the set of
alternatives – a compact subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space, Θ is a finite
set of states of the world, and for each agent i ∈ I, ui : X×Θ→ R is a state-dependent
continuous utility function. Let Li(x, θ) = {y ∈ X : ui(x, θ) ≥ ui(y, θ)} be agent i’s
lower contour set of x at state θ. A social choice function (henceforth, scf) f : Θ→ X
associates with each state of the world θ the alternative f(θ) ∈ X.
A static mechanism G is a pair 〈(MGi )i∈I , g〉 with MGi the set of messages of agent i,
and g : ×i∈IMGi → X the allocation rule. Let MG = ×j∈IMGj and MG−i = ×j∈I\{i}MGj ,
with m and m−i generic elements. The mechanism 〈MG, g〉 and the state θ induce the
strategic-form game G(θ) = 〈I, (ui(g(·), θ),MGi )i∈I〉. Let NEG(θ) ⊆ X be the set
of (pure) Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game G (θ). The social choice function f
is single-shot implementable in Nash equilibrium if there exists a static mechanism G
such that NEG (θ) = {f (θ)} for all θ ∈ Θ.
A necessary and almost sufficient condition for static Nash implementation is Maskin
monotonicity. In Definition 1, we present two equivalent, slightly unusual, formulations
of Maskin monotonicity, as they foreshadow and will help understanding our definition
of dynamic monotonicity. Call any map pi : Θ→ Θ a (static) deception and let Π1 be
the set of static deceptions. The interpretation is that when the state is θ, agents act
as if the state were pi (θ) instead.
5
Definition 1 A social choice function f is Maskin monotonic when it satisfies
(
MA
)
or, equivalently,
(
MB
)
.
(
MA
)
. For all pi ∈ Π1, for all θ ∈ Θ,
[
∀i ∈ I, Li(f(pi(θ)), pi(θ)) ⊆ Li(f(pi(θ)), θ)
]
⇒
[
f(pi(θ)) = f(θ)
]
.
(
MB
)
. For all pi ∈ Π1, for all θ ∈ Θ,
[
f(pi(θ)) 6= f(θ)
]
⇒[
∃ (i ∈ I, x ∈ X) : ui(f (pi(θ)) , pi(θ))−ui(x, pi(θ)) ≥ 0 > ui(f (pi(θ)) , θ)−ui(x, θ)
]
.
The intuition for the necessity of Maskin monotonicity is simple. Suppose that
f is implementable and let pi be a deception. At state pi(θ), there must exist an
equilibrium m∗ that implements f(pi(θ)). However, if f(pi(θ)) 6= f(θ), m∗ should not be
an equilibrium at state θ, so that at least one agent must have a profitable deviation;
that is, he must have a unilateral deviation from m∗ that induces an alternative x
strictly preferred to f(pi(θ)) at state θ. And since m∗ is an equilibrium at state pi(θ),
the deviation cannot be profitable at pi(θ); that is, f(pi(θ)) is preferred to x at state
pi(θ). Condition (MB) precisely captures this intuition.
Repeated Implementation. A repeated implementation problem, denoted PT , rep-
resents the T -time repetition of the implementation problem P ; T can be finite or
infinite. At the beginning of each period t ∈ T = {1, . . . , T}, the state of the world is
drawn from Θ with probability mass function p, with p(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. In each
period, the realized state is commonly observed by all agents, but not the designer.
Let (x(t, θ))t∈T ,θ∈Θ be a sequence of alternatives, where x(t, θ) is the alternative
implemented in state θ at period t. An agent’s expected payoff over sequences of
alternatives is given by the discounted criterion; that is, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such
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that the payoff of agent i from (x(t, θ))t∈T ,θ∈Θ is given by:3
Ui((x(t, θ))t∈T ,θ∈Θ) =
1− δ
1− δT
∑
t∈T
∑
θ∈Θ
δt−1ui(x(t, θ), θ)p(θ).
The aim of the designer is to repeatedly implement a social choice function f . A
dynamic mechanism regime specifies a mechanism in each period t, contingent on the
profile of mechanisms offered and messages played up to period t (excluding period
t). A designer history htD is a sequence of mechanisms and corresponding messages
(G1,m1, . . . , Gτ ,mτ , . . . , Gt−1,mt−1) such that Gτ is the mechanism adopted at period
τ and mτ ∈ MGτ is the corresponding message profile, for all τ < t. The set of all
possible histories observed by the designer at period t is denoted HtD. The set of
initial histories H1D is the singleton {∅} and the set of all possible designer histories is
HD = ∪Tt=1HtD.
A dynamic mechanism regime, or regime for short, specifies a lottery over static
mechanisms as a function of the designer history. We write r (G;htD) for the probability
that mechanism G is chosen after history htD.
4
We assume perfect monitoring.5 At the beginning of period t, each agent knows the
entire profile of mechanisms chosen up to period t − 1, the entire profile of messages
sent up to period t − 1, the entire profile of states of the world realized up to period
t − 1, the period t’s mechanism selected as well as the realized state of the world for
period t. Write θt = (θ1, ..., θt−1) for a profile of realized states of the world up to
period t−1. A history for agent i is thus ht = (htD, θt). Let Ht be the set of all possible
t-period agent histories and H = ∪Tt=1Ht be the set of all such histories. The only
possible initial history is the empty set: H1 = {∅}.
A pure strategy si for agent i specifies a message in each period t as a function of
3When computing payoffs starting from any period t, we use the normalizing factor 1−δ
1−δT−t+1 , so
that the discounted payoff from t is measured on the same scale as the single-shot payoff.
4We assume that, for each htD, r (·;htD) has finite support.
5In other words, we assume that the designer truthfully and publicly reveals all his information
(i.e., messages received, alternative implemented, and mechanism selected) at each period. In a more
general model, the communication policy would also be part of the design problem, i.e., the designer
would also choose how much to reveal to the agents in each period. Clearly, this can only enlarge the
set of implementable social choice functions.
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the history ht, the mechanism Gt currently selected and the current state θt; that is,
si(h
t, Gt, θt) ∈ MGti for all (ht, Gt, θt). Let s = (s1, . . . , sI) be a strategy profile. The
strategy profile s, the random draw of a state in each period, and the regime r generate
a random sequence of histories ht.
Given a regime r, we write q(ht; s) for the probability that history ht occurs when
the strategy profile is s. Throughout, we slightly abuse notation and write r(Gt;h
t)
for r(Gt;h
t
D) for any h
t = (htD, θ
t). The expected payoff of agent i when the profile of
strategies is s is:
Ui (s) =
1− δ
1− δT
∑
t∈T
∑
ht∈Ht
∑
Gt∈G
∑
θt∈Θ
δt−1ui(g
(
s
(
ht, Gt, θt
))
, θt)q
(
ht; s
)
r
(
Gt;h
t
)
p(θt).
A profile of pure strategies s∗ = (s∗i , s
∗
−i) is a pure Nash equilibrium of the dynamic
game induced by regime r if Ui(s
∗) ≥ Ui(si, s∗−i) for all strategies si, for all agents i ∈ I
(where s∗−i denotes the strategy profile of agent i’s opponents).
Definition 2 A social choice function f is repeatedly implementable if there exists a
dynamic mechanism regime r such that (i) there exists a Nash equilibrium s∗ of the
dynamic game induced by r and (ii) for each Nash equilibrium s induced by r, we have
g (s (ht, Gt, θt)) = f (θt) for all θt ∈ Θ, for all (ht, Gt) such that q (ht; s) > 0 and
r (Gt;h
t) > 0, for all t ∈ T .
Intuitively, a social choice function is repeatedly implementable if we can construct
a dynamic mechanism whose unique equilibrium outcome is f(θ) in all periods where
the state is θ. As it is customary in the literature, Definition 2 does not rule out mixed
strategy equilibria with outcome realizations different from f(θ). In Section 6 we will
show that it is possible to rule out such undesirable mixed strategy equilibria.
We end this section with three notions of efficiency of an scf. The expected payoff
of agent i when f is repeatedly implemented is vfi =
∑
θ∈Θ ui(f(θ), θ)p(θ). Let F(f) =
{f ′ : Θ→ X : f ′(Θ) ⊆ f(Θ)} be the set of social choice functions with a range (weakly)
smaller than f , V (f) = {(vi)i∈I : vi = vf ′i for all i ∈ I, for some f ′ ∈ F(f)} be the
associated (expected) payoff profiles, and co(V (f)) be the convex hull of V (f).
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The social choice function f is weakly efficient in the range if there does not exist
a payoff profile (vi)i∈I ∈ co(V (f)) such that vi > vfi for all i ∈ I; f is efficient in the
range if there does not exist a payoff profile (vi)i∈I ∈ co(V (f)) such that vi ≥ vfi for
all i ∈ I and vi > vfi for some i ∈ I; f is strictly efficient in the range if it is efficient
in the range and there exists no f ′ ∈ F(f) , f ′ 6= f , such that vf ′i = vfi for all i ∈ I.6
3 Two Examples
This section illustrates repeated implementation with the help of two simple examples.
Example 1: Trading a Good. This is a multi-period variation of the leading example
of Aghion et al. (2012), which they attribute to Hart and Moore (2003).
There are two periods, t = 1, 2, a buyer B and a seller S. In each period, the seller
has a good for sale; the quality θ of the good is independently drawn in each period
and equally likely to be θL = 10 or θH = 14. The buyer and the seller have a common
discount factor δ and observe the good’s quality at the beginning of each period.
As in Aghion et al., payments to and from a third party are allowed. Hence, the
set of outcomes X is the set of triplets (z, pB, pS) with z ∈ {0, 1} representing whether
the good is traded (z = 1) or not (z = 0), pB ∈ P representing the price paid by the
buyer, and pS ∈ P representing the price paid to the seller, where P is a (arbitrarily
large) closed interval in R. For any outcome (z, pB, pS), the (per-period) buyer’s utility
is u(zθ − pB) when the good quality is θ, with u(0) = 0 and u a strictly increasing,
strictly concave function. The seller’s utility is pS.
We want to implement the efficient allocation prescribing that in each period the
good is traded and the buyer pays the seller the true quality, pB = pS = θ; that is,
the scf we want to implement is: f (θL) = (1, 10, 10) and f (θH) = (1, 14, 14).
7 Since
f is not Maskin monotonic, it cannot be implemented in Nash equilibrium in a static
setting.8
6Efficiency and strict efficiency in the range were first defined by Lee and Sabourian (2011).
7Note that if u′(0) = 1, then this allocation also maximizes total surplus.
8Formally, we have that LB(f(θL), θL) = {(z, pB , pS) : u(0) ≥ u(zθL−pB)} ⊆ {(z, pB , pS) : u(4) ≥
u(zθH − pB)} = LB(f(θL), θH), while LS(f(θL), θL) = LS(f(θL), θH). Since f(θL) 6= f(θH), we have
a violation of Maskin monotonicity.
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We now present a simple dynamic mechanism that repeatedly implements f in
Nash equilibrium. In the first period, the buyer and the seller report a message in
{θL, NθL, NθH , θH}. We interpret the report θk as stating that “the quality is θk.” The
reports Nθk are objections that lead to different first-period allocations and second-
period mechanisms than announcing either θH or θL. In the second period, the buyer
and the seller have the opportunity to make an additional report in {θL, θH} if and
only if they have reported the same quality in the first period. In all other cases, the
second period allocation is chosen without requiring buyer and seller to make reports.
Table 1 gives the allocation rule in the first period along with the regime.
Seller
Buyer
θL NθL NθH θH
θL
(1, 10, 10) (1, 10, 10) (0,1,1) (0,1,1)
↪→ G2 ↪→ (1, 11, 11) ↪→ (0, 0, 0) ↪→ (0, 0, 0)
NθL
(1, 14, 10) (1, 14, 14) (1,0,0) (0,1,1)
↪→ (0,−y, 0) ↪→ (1, 14, 14) ↪→ (1, 0, 0) ↪→ (0, 0, 0)
NθH
(0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0) (1,14,14) (1,14,10)
↪→ (0, 0, 0) ↪→ (1, 0, 0) ↪→ (1, 14, 14) ↪→ (0, 0, 0)
θH
(0, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1) (1,14,14) (1,14,14)
↪→ (0, 0, 0) ↪→ (0, 0, 0) ↪→ (1, 11, 11) ↪→ G2
Table 1: The first-period allocation and the transition↪→ to the second period allocation
or game played in Example 1.
Table 1 has 16 cells, one for each possible report profile in the first period; the
row (resp., column) report is the buyer (resp., seller) report. Each cell has two ele-
ments. The top element gives the first-period allocation, while the bottom element
(indicated with the symbol ↪→) gives the transition to the second-period mechanism.
For instance, if the buyer reports θL and the seller NθL, the first-period allocation is
(1, 10, 10), while the second-period mechanism implements (1, 11, 11) and requires no
second-period reports. When the buyer and the seller report the same quality in the
first period, the second-period mechanism is G2, given in Table 2:
9
We claim that whenever y is chosen so that −u(−4) > δu(y) > u(4), the unique
9On the equilibrium path, mechanism G2 guarantees that trade takes place in the second period
and the expected price is 12 for both the buyer and the seller.
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θL θH
θL (1, 10, 10) (0, 0, 0)
θH (0, 0, 0) (1, 14, 14)
Table 2: The second-period mechanism G2 in Example 1.
pure strategy equilibrium implements the efficient allocation in both periods.10 This
is verified in the Appendix, which presents the two reduced strategic-form games that
are obtained by conditioning on the first-period quality.11
A notable feature of our mechanism is that it provides at least one agent with the
incentive to deviate early (at t = 1) from future (at t = 2) coordination on undesirable
equilibria (coordinating on announcing θL when the good’s quality is θH). It is precisely
the ability to provide such incentives in a dynamic setting that allows the repeated Nash
implementation of social choice functions, like the one in this example, that are not
implementable in a static setting.
Example 2: Task Assignment. In each of a possibly infinite number of periods,
a principal needs to assign two agents (experts), 1 and 2, to one of two tasks, A and
B. There are two states of the world, θ ∈ {θA, θB}. The agents know the state of
the world, but not the principal. In state θA (resp., θB), task A (resp., B) yields the
principal a benefit v greater than the cost to undertake it, while the other task yields
zero benefit and cost. An allocation is a quadruplet (a1, a2, w1, w2), with ai ∈ {A,B}
the assignment of agent i ∈ {1, 2} and wi ≥ 0 his wage. When the state is θ, the
assignment is (ai, a−i) and the wage wi, agent i’s payoff is wi − ci(ai, a−i, θ), where
ci(ai, a−i, θ) is agent i’s cost of executing task ai when the other agent is assigned
to task a−i, at state θ. There are complementarities: the more agents work on a
task, the less costly it is: ci(ai, a−i, θ) = 1 if (ai, a−i, θ) = (A,A, θA) = (B,B, θB),
ci(ai, a−i, θ) = 3 if (ai, a−i, θ) = (A,B, θA) = (B,A, θB) and the cost is zero otherwise;
in addition, v is sufficiently large, e.g., v > 4, so that it is profitable for the principal
to induce the agents to work on the right task.
10The existence of y follows from observing that u(4) + u(−4) < 0, since u is strictly concave and
u(0) = 0.
11As we argue in Section 6, undesirable mixed strategy equilibria could also be ruled out, at the
cost of introducing a more complicated mechanism.
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The principal wants to maximize his ex-post profit in each period, subject to giving
the agents at least their per-period outside option payoff, which we normalize to zero.
This corresponds to the scf f(θA) = (A,A, 1, 1) and f(θB) = (B,B, 1, 1). Note that f
maximizes social surplus in each period and state.
The scf f is Maskin monotonic, but it is not efficient relative to social choice func-
tions having (weakly) smaller ranges. For instance, the function f ∗ (θA) = (B,B, 1, 1),
f ∗(θB) = (A,A, 1, 1), with agents being paid to work on the unprofitable task, gives
a strictly higher expected utility to both agents than f . Thus, if the agents are suffi-
ciently patient, then f cannot be repeatedly implemented in infinite horizon problems
(Theorem 1, Lee and Sabourian, 2011).
At the end of Section 5 we will show that f is infinitely repeatedly implementable
if the discount factor is not too large. We now argue that the f is repeatedly imple-
mentable in any finite horizon problem. Consider the static mechanism where each
agent has two messages θA and θB, and the allocation rule is represented in Table 3;
Table 4 displays the payoffs to each agent of each alternative in each state.
Agent 2
Agent 1
θA θB
θA (A,A, 1, 1) (B,A, 2, 2)
θB (A,B, 2, 2) (B,B, 1, 1)
Table 3: The static mechanism in Example 2.
θA θB
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 1 Agent 2
(A,A, 1, 1) 0 0 1 1
(B,B, 1, 1) 1 1 0 0
(B,A, 2, 2) 2 −1 −1 2
(A,B, 2, 2) −1 2 2 −1
Table 4: Agents’ payoffs in Example 2.
At state θA, the mechanism induces a prisoners’ dilemma, with (θA, θA) as the
unique Nash equilibrium and equilibrium outcome (A,A, 1, 1). Similarly, at state θB,
the mechanism induces a prisoners’ dilemma, with (θB, θB) as the unique Nash equi-
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librium and equilibrium outcome (B,B, 1, 1). So, f is implementable when T = 1.
More fundamentally, at states θA and θB, the unique equilibrium payoff coincides with
the min-max payoff. Consequently, repeated play of the stage game equilibrium is
the only Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated game (e.g., see Benoˆıt and Krishna,
1987, and Gonza´lez-Dı´az, 2006), and by selecting the mechanism regime that uses the
static mechanism in each round, f can be finitely repeatedly implemented in Nash
equilibrium, regardless of the number of periods.
This shows that there is an important difference between what can be implemented
in finitely repeated problems and what can be implemented in infinitely repeated prob-
lems with an arbitrarily large discount factor, as studied by Lee and Sabourian (2011).
4 Dynamic Monotonicity
Consider any period t and any sequence (uτi )τ≥t of payoffs from period t onwards. We
can write agent i’s discounted payoff at period t as
1− δ
1− δT−t+1
(
uti + δ
T∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t−1uτi
)
= (1− βt,T )uti + βt,Tvi(t),
where vi(t) is the (normalized) discounted continuation payoff and βt,T is the (normal-
ized) discount factor at period t: that is,
vi(t) =
1− δ
1− δT−t
T∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t−1uτi and βt,T =
δ − δT−t+1
1− δT−t+1 .
When the horizon is infinite, i.e., T = ∞, we have βt,∞ = δ. The lowest and highest
expected payoff agent i can obtain are:
vi =
∑
θ∈Θ
min
x∈X
ui(x, θ)p(θ), vi =
∑
θ∈Θ
max
x∈X
ui(x, θ)p(θ).
For each t ∈ T \ {T}, let Vi(t) be the closed interval [vi, vi] with the convention
that Vi(T ) = {0} if T < ∞. The set Vi(t) corresponds to the set of feasible agent
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i’s (normalized) continuation payoffs at period t. Denote by vfi (t) the (normalized)
expected discounted payoff of agent i when f is implemented from period t+1 onwards.
Thus, vfi (t) = v
f
i =
∑
θ∈Θ ui(f(θ), θ)p(θ) if t < T , and v
f
i (T ) = 0 if T <∞.
We now generalize the important concept of deception to the dynamic setting. At
each period t, a deception specifies a state θˆt as function of the realized state θt and
the history of realized states up to period t, θt. Formally, a deception pi is a sequence
of maps (pit : Θ
t×Θ→ Θ)Tt=1. Intuitively, suppose that each agent is asked to directly
report a state at each period (as in a direct mechanism). A deception then corresponds
to a situation where the agents coordinate their reports to θˆt = pit(θ
t, θt) at period t,
when the current state is θt and the profile of realized states is θ
t.12 (If reports are
not coordinated, the designer detects a lie and can punish the agents.) Of course, the
mechanism does not have to be direct. Nonetheless, the concept of a deception remains
important: agents can play at period t and realized states θt as if the current state is
pit(θ
t, θt) and not θt. A special deception is pi
∗, given by pi∗t (θ
t, θt) = θt for all (θ
t, θt),
for all t. This corresponds to truth-telling. Let ΠT be the set of deceptions.
We define the (normalized) expected discounted continuation payoff of agent i from
following the deception pi after state history (θt, θt) recursively as follows:
vfpii (θ
t, θt) =
∑
θt+1∈Θ
(
(1− βt+1,T )ui
(
f
(
pit+1((θ
t, θt), θt+1)
)
, θt+1
)
+ βt+1,Tv
fpi
i ((θ
t, θt), θt+1))
)
p (θt+1) .
This is agent i’s discounted continuation payoff if, in all periods τ > t, the designer
uses the social choice function f at the reported state piτ (θ
τ , θτ ) to determine the
period τ alternative. Note that the discounted continuation payoff vfpi∗i (θ
t, θt) from the
truth-telling deception pi∗ is equal to vfi (t), regardless of (θ
t, θt).
For any history of realized states θt and deception pi, we define the dynamic lower
contour set of x at θt as
Lfpii,θt(x, θt) ={(y, vi(t)) ∈ X × Vi(t) : (1− βt,T )ui(y, θt) + βt,Tvi(t) ≤
(1− βt,T )ui(x, θt) + βt,Tvfpii ((θt, θt))}.
12Note that pi and the history of realized states θt determine a unique history of reported states.
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Dynamic lower contour sets are defined in the space of alternatives and continuation
payoffs. Intuitively, for any deception pi and history of states θt, the dynamic lower
contour set at θt is composed of all the pairs of alternatives and continuation payoffs
that give agent i a smaller expected discounted payoff than when x is implemented at
state θt in period t and agents continue to follow the deception pi from period t + 1
onwards. Note that Lfpi∗i,θt (x, θt) does not depend on θ
t, since the truth-telling deception
pi∗ does not. With a slight abuse of notation, we therefore write Lfi,t(x, θt) for L
fpi∗
i,θt (x, θt).
We are now ready to present two equivalent definitions of dynamic monotonicity,
the dynamic generalization of Maskin monotonicity.
Definition 3 (Dynamic Monotonicity) A social choice function f is dynamic mono-
tonic if it satisfies
(
DMA
)
or, equivalently,
(
DMB
)
.
(
DMA
)
. For all pi ∈ ΠT , for all θT ∈ ΘT ,
[
∀(i ∈ I, t ∈ T ), Lfi,t(f(pit(θt, θt)), pit(θt, θt)) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(pit(θt, θt), θt)
]
⇒[
∀(t ∈ T ), f(pit(θt, θt)) = f(θt)
]
.
(
DMB
)
. For all pi ∈ ΠT , for all θT ∈ ΘT ,
[
∃(t′ ∈ T ) : f(pit′(θt′ , θt′)) 6= f(θt′)
]
⇒[
∃(i ∈ I, t ∈ T , x ∈ X, vi ∈ Vi(t)) :
(1− βt,T ) [ui(f
(
pit(θ
t, θt)
)
, pit(θ
t, θt))− ui(x, pit(θt, θt))] + βt,T [vfi (t)− vi] ≥ 0,
0 > (1− βt,T ) [ui(f
(
pit(θ
t, θt)
)
, θt)− ui(x, θt)] + βt,T [vfpii (θt, θt)− vi]
]
.
Intuitively, dynamic monotonicity says that if agents coordinate on a deception
that induces an undesirable alternative at some period t′ (for some profile of realized
states), then at least one agent must have a profitable deviation starting at some time
t. Since the problem is dynamic, the profitable deviation does not have to start at t′; it
could start before or after, t needs not equal t′. For instance, in Example 1, the seller
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has a profitable deviation at the first period from the second-period coordination on
trading the high quality good at the low price.
It is worth noting that we can restrict attention to deceptions that weakly dominate
truth-telling in checking for dynamic monotonicity, i.e., to deceptions pi such that
vfpii (θ
t, θt) ≥ vfi for all i, for all (θt, θt), for all t.
Few additional observations are worth making. First, for T = 1, dynamic mono-
tonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity. Second, observe that when T =∞, βt,T = δ
for all t, and the dynamic lower contour sets do not vary with t. Consequently, when
checking for dynamic monotonicity, it is sufficient to consider t = 1. Third, an easy-
to-check sufficient condition for dynamic monotonicity is as follows. For each agent i,
define vmaxi = maxpi:Θ→Θ
∑
θ ui(f(pi(θ)), θ)p(θ) as the highest payoff that agent i can
obtain if all agents coordinate on the most favorable static deception pi for agent i
(vmaxi is also the highest payoff that agent i can obtain by maximizing over all dy-
namic deceptions). Suppose that f(θ) 6= f(θ∗). Using (DMB), a sufficient condition
for dynamic monotonicity is that for all deceptions such that pit′(θ
t′ , θ∗) = θ for some
θt
′ ∈ Θt′ and t′ ∈ T , there exist t ∈ T , i ∈ I, x ∈ X, and vi(t) ∈ Vi(t) that satisfy
(1− βt,T )ui(f(θ), θ) + βt,Tvfi ≥ (1− βt,T )ui(x, θ) + βt,Tvi(t),
and
(1− βt,T )ui(f(θ), θ∗) + βt,Tvmaxi < (1− βt,T )ui(x, θ∗) + βt,Tvi(t).
The example illustrating Remark 5 shows that this condition is easy to check.
We end this section with a series of remarks. The message we want to convey is
that dynamic monotonicity is the “general” condition for repeated Nash implementa-
tion. It reduces to Maskin monotonicity when there is a single period and essentially
corresponds to Lee and Sabourian’s (2011) efficiency in the range when there is an
infinite number of periods and a discount factor close to one.
The first remark gives another easy-to-check sufficient condition for the dynamic
monotonicity of a social choice function. The second remark states that, in finite
horizon problems, dynamic monotonicity is weaker than Maskin monotonicity. The
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converse is false; Example 1 demonstrates that dynamic monotonicity is strictly weaker
than Maskin monotonicity.
Remark 1 If the social choice function f is strictly efficient in the range and (vfi )i∈I
is an extreme point of co(V (f)), then f is dynamic monotonic whenever T ≥ 2.
Remark 2 Suppose T <∞. If f is Maskin monotonic, then it is dynamic monotonic.
Remark 3 Suppose T = ∞. There exists δH ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ∈ (δH , 1), if
f is dynamic monotonic, then it is weakly efficient in the range.
Remark 4 Suppose T =∞. If f is Maskin monotonic and efficient in the range, then
it is dynamic monotonic.
Remark 5 There are social choice functions, which are neither efficient nor Maskin
monotonic, and yet are dynamically monotonic.
As a demonstration of Remark 5, suppose that there are two agents, two periods,
no discounting (i.e., δ = 1), two equiprobable states of the world θ and θ′, and five
alternatives a, b, c, d, e. Let the payoffs be as in Table 5.
θ θ′
a 3, 3 1, 7
b 6, 0 3, 3
c 10, 10 10, 10
d −10,−10 0, 0
e 0, 0 −10,−10
Table 5: Agents’ payoffs in the example illustrating Remark 5.
The social choice function is f(θ) = a and f(θ′) = b, and the associated payoff
profile is (vf1 , v
f
2 ) = (3, 3). It is not Maskin monotonic since Li(f(θ
′), θ′) ⊆ Li(f(θ′), θ)
for all i, and yet f(θ′) 6= f(θ). It is also not efficient in the range since if players
coordinate on θ (resp., θ′) when the state is θ′ (resp., θ), then they each obtain a payoff
of 7/2. Yet, f is dynamic monotonic. To see this, remember that vmaxi is the highest
payoff that agent i can obtain if all agents coordinate on the most favorable deception
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for agent i, and note that vmax1 = 9/2, while v
max
2 = 5. It is immediate to check that
the pair (d, 10) satisfies
u1(f(θ), θ) + v
f
1 = 3 + 3 ≥ −10 + 10 = u1(d, θ) + v1,
max(u1(f(θ), θ
′), u1(f(θ′), θ′)) + vmax1 = 3 + 9/2 < 0 + 10 = u1(d, θ
′) + v1.
Similarly, the pair (e, 10) satisfies
u2(f(θ
′), θ′) + vf2 = 3 + 3 ≥ −10 + 10 = u2(e, θ′) + v2,
max(u2(f(θ
′), θ), u2(f(θ), θ)) + vmax2 = 3 + 5 < 0 + 10 = u1(e, θ) + v2.
We have the necessary preference reversals in the first period and, therefore, the social
choice function is dynamic monotonic.
The final remark states that in finitely repeated settings the set of social choice
functions that are dynamic monotonic is weakly increasing in T .
Remark 6 Suppose T < ∞ and f is dynamic monotonic over T periods. Then f is
also dynamic monotonic over T + 1 periods.13
5 Main Results
This section presents our main results, stating that dynamic monotonicity is necessary
and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation. We begin with necessity.
Theorem 1 (Necessity) If the social choice function f is repeatedly implementable,
then it is dynamic monotonic.
The intuition for Theorem 1 is simple and analogous to the intuition for the necessity
of Maskin monotonicity in static implementation problems. If the social choice function
f is implementable, there must exist a mechanism and an equilibrium such that f(θt)
13We thank an anonymous referee for asking us to verify whether this claim holds.
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is implemented at period t and state θt, and the continuation payoff to any agent i
is vfi (t), for any t ∈ T . Moreover, for any realized profile of states θt, all deviations
at period t and state θt must give to agent i an alternative x and a continuation
payoff vi in L
f
i,θt(f(θt), θt). Consider a deception pi and a “collusive” equilibrium in
which agents follow the deception (on the equilibrium path) and revert to the original
equilibrium after unilateral deviations. In particular, agents pretend that the state
is pit(θ
t, θ∗t ) = θt when the realized state at period t is θ
∗
t and the history of realized
states up to period t is θt. As a result, f(θt) = f(pit(θ
t, θ∗t )) is implemented at t in
state θ∗t , and the expected payoff of agent i is (1− βt,T )ui(f(θt), θ∗t ) + βt,Tvfpii (θt, θ∗t ).
If Lfi,t(f(θt), θt) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ∗t ), then agent i has no profitable deviation from the
“collusive” equilibrium. For otherwise, he would have had a profitable deviation at
state θt from the original equilibrium. Hence, for f to be implemented, it must be
f (θ∗t ) = f (θt); that is, f must be dynamic monotonic.
We now consider sufficient conditions. As in static implementation problems, we
distinguish between the case of two and more than two agents. We need to introduce
some additional definitions.
For each Y ⊆ X, define maxθi Y = {x ∈ Y : ui(x, θ) ≥ ui(y, θ) for all y ∈ Y } as
agent i’s maximal set in Y at state θ. A social choice function f satisfies no-veto power
if: For all θ ∈ Θ, x ∈ maxθi X for all i ∈ I∗ with |I∗| ≥ I − 1 implies f(θ) = x. Maskin
monotonicity and no-veto power are sufficient for static Nash implementation when
there are at least three agents. A similar results holds in the repeated setting once we
replace Maskin monotonicity with dynamic monotonicity.
Theorem 2 (Sufficiency I ≥ 3) Let I ≥ 3. If the social choice function f is dynamic
monotonic and satisfies no-veto power, then it is repeatedly implementable.
The proof is constructive. The main building block of our construction is the
static mechanism G∗, a close relative to Maskin’s (1999) canonical mechanism. The
mechanism G∗ requires the agents to report a state, an alternative, a continuation
payoff, and an integer. At period t, “unanimous” reports (θt, f (θt) , v
f
i (t), 0) result in
the realization of f (θt) and in the adoption of G
∗ in the next period. A unilateral
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deviation from unanimity by agent j at t, (θj,t, xj,t, vj,t, nj,t), results in the realization
of xj,t at t and in the continuation payoff v
j
t thereafter, if (xj,t, vj,t) is in agent j’s
dynamic contour set Lfj,t (f (θt) , θt) (where θt is the common state report of all agents
but agent j). Alternatively, the deviation results in the realization of f (θt) at period
t and in the continuation payoff vfj (t) thereafter. To guarantee that agent j obtains
vj,t (or v
f
j (t)) in the future, the regime appropriately randomizes between adopting
a mechanism where agent j is dictatorial (i.e., chooses the alternative), which would
guarantee he receives vj, and a punishment mechanism where agent j would get less
than vj,t (or v
f
j (t)). Any other report profile at t leads to the agent reporting the
highest integer at t being dictatorial at t and in all future periods. Notice that the
mechanism G∗ is equivalent to Maskin’s canonical mechanism when T = 1, and indeed
guarantees the implementation of f for very similar arguments than in Maskin (1999).
As the canonical Maskin mechanism with T = 1, our mechanism regime does not rule
out undesirable mixed strategy equilibria. As we discuss in Section 6, under a mild
additional assumption we can eliminate them.14
The dynamic mechanism regime we construct only uses stage mechanisms that are
deterministic functions of the agents’ messages, but permits random transitions be-
tween these mechanisms. Without making further assumptions, it seems impossible to
prove Theorem 2 without the help of stochastic transitions or, alternatively, stochastic
stage mechanisms.15 Yet, in environments with transfers and quasi-linear preferences,
there is no need for stochastic transitions; we can always adjust the transfers to guar-
antee that the agent obtains the appropriate continuation payoff.
As Maskin’s (1999) theorem for static Nash implementation, Theorem 2 requires
no-veto power. We can weaken the no-veto power requirement. For instance, Theorem
2 remains valid if we replace no-veto power with Assumption A, stated below, which
is closely related to the conditions µ(ii) and µ(iii) of Moore and Repullo.16 We first
need some additional notation. Let ϕt : {t+ 1, . . . , T} ×Θ→ X be a time-dependent
14See Mezzetti and Renou (2012) for an alternative definition of static implementation in mixed
Nash equilibrium.
15Azacis and Vida (2015) use random mechanisms and random transitions in their analysis of
infinitely repeated implementation problems.
16We prove this and the following claim in footnotes 22 and 23.
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social choice function and write vϕti the continuation payoff of implementing ϕt from
period t+ 1 onwards, that is,
vϕti :=
1− δ
1− δT−t
T∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t−1ui(ϕt(τ, θ), θ)p(θ).
For any vi ∈ Vi(t), define λ (vi) = vi−vivi−vi . We are now ready to state Assumption A.
Assumption A: A social choice function f satisfies Assumption A if:
(i) for all (x, vi(t)) ∈ Li,t (f(θ), θ) with i ∈ I, θ ∈ Θ and t ∈ T and for all pairs
(ϕt, ϕt) such that:
(a1) either λ(vi(t)) = 0, or ϕt(τ, θ) ∈ ∩j maxθj X for all θ ∈ Θ, for all τ > t,17
(a2) ϕt(τ, θ) ∈ ∩j 6=i maxθj X for all θ ∈ Θ, for all τ > t,
(b) x ∈ ∩j 6=i maxθ∗j X,
(c) βt,Tui(x, θ
∗) + (1− βt,T )
[
λ (vi(t)) v
ϕt
i + (1− λ (vi(t))) vϕti
]
≥
βt,Tui(y, θ
∗) + (1− βt,T )vi for all (y, vi) ∈ Li,t (f(θ), θ),
we have that x = f (θ∗), and ϕt(τ, ·) = ϕt(τ, ·) = f for all τ > t;
(ii) for all x such that x ∈ ∩j maxθ∗j X, we have that x = f (θ∗).
Condition (i) is similar to condition µ(ii) of Moore and Repullo. It states that
if x maximizes the payoff of all agents but agent i at state θ∗, if ϕt maximizes the
continuation payoff of all agents while ϕt maximize the continuation payoff of all agents
but agent i, and if the pair (x, λ (vi(t)) v
ϕt
i + (1− λ (vi(t))) vϕti ) is maximal in the
dynamic lower contour set Li,t (f(θ), θ) at state θ
∗, then not only alternative x must
coincide with f(θ∗) at state θ∗, but also ϕt(τ, ·) and ϕt(τ, ·) must coincide with f for
all τ > t. Note that condition (i) is weaker than no-veto power and is almost identical
to condition µ(ii) at period T , when T <∞. Condition (ii) is a unanimity condition.
We now consider the two-agent case. As shown by Dutta and Sen (1991) and Moore
and Repullo (1990), for the static case with two agents, self-selection is a necessary
17We thank Helmuts Azacis and Peter Vida for pointing out the need to add λ(vi(t)) = 0 as a
special case.
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condition for Nash implementation.18 Our sufficiency result for two agents requires a
strengthening of self-selection.19
Assumption B : There exists an alternative w such that ui(w, θ) < ui(f(θ
′), θ) for all
(θ′, θ) ∈ Θ×Θ, for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
Assumption B requires that there exists a bad outcome (relative to f) for both
agents. For instance, in pure exchange economies with strictly monotone preferences,
the zero consumption bundle is a bad outcome relative to any social choice function that
gives positive consumption to each consumer in at least one state of the world. Other
examples satisfying Assumption B include environments with transferable utilities, like
our two examples in Section 3. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Sufficiency I = 2) Let I = 2. Suppose Assumptions A and B hold. If
a social choice function f is dynamic monotonic, then it is repeatedly implementable.
We now briefly return to Example 1 and 2.
Example 1 (revisited) The set V (f) of expected (ex-ante) payoff vectors that the
two parties would obtain with an scf whose range is a subset of {(1, 10, 10), (1, 14, 14)},
the range of f , is:
{(
u(4)
2
, 10
)
, (0, 12) ,
(
u(−4)+u(4)
2
, 12
)
,
(
u(−4)
2
, 14
)}
. Thus f , which
yields expected payoffs
(
vfB, v
f
S
)
= (0, 12) is strictly efficient and an extreme point in
the convex hull of V (f). By Remark 1, f is dynamic monotonic. Since Assumptions
A and B hold, f is repeatedly implementable in Nash equilibrium irrespective of the
discount factor, as long as there are at least two periods.
Example 2 (revisited) Consider an infinitely repeated setting. To show under which
condition f is dynamic monotonic when T = ∞, we can use the sufficient condition
provided after Definition 3. Observe that vfi = 0 for all i ∈ I and that the best possible
“collusive” deception is pit (θ
t, θA) = θB and pit (θ
t, θB) = θA for all θ
t, for all t ∈ T .
Under such a deception vfpii (θ
t, θ) = vfpii = 1 for all i ∈ I. (This corresponds to vmaxi .)
Given the symmetry of the set-up, we only need to consider the pairs (θA, θB) with
18In Proposition 1 in the Appendix, we show that a weaker condition, dynamic self-selection, is
necessary for repeated Nash implementation.
19Self-selection: Let I = 2. There exists x(θ2, θ1) ∈ L1(f(θ2), θ2)∩L2(f(θ1), θ1) for all pairs (θ2, θ1).
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pit(θ
t, θB) = θA. Since f (θB) 6= f (θA), dynamic monotonicity (DMB) requires that
there exist i ∈ I, x ∈ X and vi ∈ Vi (t) such that
(1− δ) [ui(f (θA) , θA)− ui(x, θA)] + δ [0− vi] ≥ 0,
0 > (1− δ) [ui(f (θA) , θB)− ui(x, θB)] + δ [1− vi] .
This is equivalent to:
− (1− δ)ui(x, θA) ≥ δvi > 1− (1− δ)ui(x, θB). (1)
By symmetry, we may take i to be any agent, say agent 1. The only alternatives x that
may satisfy (1) for agent 1 assign agent 1 to task A and agent 2 to task B. Letting
x = (A,B,w1, w2), (1) becomes (1− δ) (3− w1) ≥ δvi > 1− (1− δ)w1, which holds if
and only if δ < 2/3. This shows that f satisfies dynamic monotonicity if the discount
factor is less than 2/3. Thus, dynamic monotonicity does not imply weak efficiency in
infinite horizon problems when the discount factor is not too large. Since the setting
of the example satisfies Assumptions A and B, with an infinite time horizon f can be
repeatedly implemented, and collusion among the agents avoided, as long as δ < 2/3.
6 Discussion
This section discusses some important aspect of our analysis.
Mixed Strategies. The proof of Theorem 2 does not rule out undesirable mixed
strategy equilibria. We now show that the theorem extends to mixed strategies under
the mild additional assumption of no indifference, which states that no agent is totally
indifferent between all alternatives at all states.
We say that a scf f is repeatedly implementable in mixed Nash equilibrium if it it
is repeatedly implementable in Nash equilibrium and, in addition, there are no mixed
strategy Nash equilibria that yield in some period t an outcome y /∈ f(θ) with positive
probability, when the state is θ.
Theorem 4 Let I ≥ 3. Assume no indifference holds. If the social choice function f
is dynamic monotonic and satisfies no-veto power, then it is repeatedly implementable
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in mixed Nash equilibrium.
Two obstacles must be overcome when dealing with mixing by agents. First, the
best message for an agent to send depends on the messages sent by the other agents, but
the agent has no certainty over such messages when the other agents mix. For instance,
announcing a large integer so as to become a dictator entails the risk of being the odd-
man-out when others play unanimously. Second, we need to consider distributions
over deceptions in order to account for mixed strategies, i.e., distributions over pure
strategies. In the proof, we overcome these difficulties by introducing random stage
mechanisms. This guarantees that mixing only occur in the last period in all equilibria
(if there is a last period). Moreover, the last-period mechanism is a version of the
mechanism in Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002), which allows agents to propose alternatives
contingent on the state report of their opponents. This guarantees that no undesirable
equilibria exist.
Subgame Perfection. The solution concept adopted in this paper is Nash equilib-
rium. All our results extend straightforwardly to subgame perfection. First, it is easy
to check that the Nash equilibrium sE constructed in the proof of Theorem 2 (and
Theorem 3) is subgame perfect. Since there are no undesirable Nash equilibria, hence
no undesirable subgame perfect Nash equilibria, this implies that dynamic monotonic-
ity together with no veto power (or assumption A) are sufficient for subgame perfect
implementation. Dynamic monotonicity is also necessary as long as the mechanism
adopted in each period is a static mechanism. To see this, suppose that f is repeatedly
implementable in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and let s be an implementing
equilibrium. Assume that there exists a deception pi such that for all t ∈ T , for all
θt ∈ Θt, for all pairs (θt, θ∗t ) with pit(θt, θ∗t ) = θt, we have Lfi,t(f(θt), θt) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ∗t )
for all i ∈ I. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we can construct a Nash equilibrium s′
that implements f(pit(θ
t, ·)) at all periods t and at all profiles θt of realized states up
to period t. Moreover, off the equilibrium path, s′ agrees with s, so that s′ is also a
subgame perfect equilibrium and hence f must be dynamic monotonic.20
20It is important to stress that the restriction to static mechanisms within a period rules out
the mechanisms used by Moore and Repullo (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1990) to show that, in
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Time-dependent social choice functions. We have assumed that the designer
wants to implement the same social choice function f in each period. A more general
objective would be to implement a sequence (ft)t∈T of social choice functions. It
is straightforward to modify the definitions of continuation payoffs, dynamic lower
contour sets and dynamic monotonicity to account for time-dependent social choice
functions. With these modifications, dynamic monotonicity remains necessary and
almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation.
Social choice correspondences. The analysis extends to the implementation of
social choice correspondences. Let F : Θ→ 2X \{∅} be a social choice correspondence;
denote by F the set of all possible social choice functions which are selections of F .
A social choice correspondence is implementable if there exists a dynamic mechanism
such that for every selection f ∈ F, there exists a Nash equilibrium that repeatedly
implements f , and every Nash equilibrium repeatedly implements a selection f ∈ F.
A social choice correspondence F is dynamic monotonic when it satisfies:(
DMAC
)
For all f ∈ F, for all pi ∈ ΠT , for all θT ∈ ΘT ,
[∀ (i ∈ I, t ∈ T ) , Lfi,t(f(pit(θt, θt)), pit(θt, θt)) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(pit(θt, θt), θt)]⇒
[∃f ∗ ∈ F : ∀t ∈ T , f(pit(θt, θt)) = f ∗(θt)].
Note that the concept of dynamic monotonicity (for correspondences) is equiva-
lent to Maskin monotonicity (for correspondences) in static implementation problems,
and clearly equivalent to Definition 3 when F is single-valued. To see the neces-
sity of the modified condition of dynamic monotonicity, suppose that F is repeatedly
implementable and assume that there exist a selection f ∈ F, a deception pi such
that for all t ∈ T , for all θt ∈ Θt, for all pairs (θt, θ∗t ) with pit(θt, θ∗t ) = θt, we have
Lfi,t(f(θt), θt) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ∗t ) for all i ∈ I. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we can
construct an equilibrium that implements f(pit(θ
t, ·)) at all periods t and at all profiles
θt of realized states up to period t. Consequently, there must exist f ∗ ∈ F such that
f(pit(θ
t, ·)) = f ∗, for all θt ∈ Θt, for all t ∈ T , i.e., F must be dynamic monotonic.
single-shot environments, subgame-perfect implementation is substantially more permissive than Nash
implementation.
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To show sufficiency, we need to augment the dynamic mechanism regime in the proof
of Theorem 2 with an initial stage (period t = 0), in which all agents announce a
selection f ∈ F. If all agents announce the same selection f ∈ F at period t = 0,
then our dynamic mechanism regime takes effect from t = 1 with f the social choice
function adopted in the canonical mechanism G∗t . If not all agents make the same
announcement at t = 0, then our dynamic mechanism regime takes effect from t = 1
with an arbitrary f ∗ ∈ F as the social choice function adopted in G∗t .
7 Conclusions
Our main contribution is to introduce the condition of dynamic monotonicity, a natural
but non-trivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and to show, in Theorems
1-4, that dynamic monotonicity is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash
implementation of social choice functions, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or
infinite and whether the discount factor is “large” or “small.”21
Many economic applications of implementation theory, for example most of the
contracting literature (e.g., see Aghion et al., 2012, or Maskin and Tirole, 1999) focus
on static problems. One of the main insights of our paper is that the (finitely) repeated
implementation of desirable social choice functions is easier than static implementation,
as last-period, or late periods, planned deviations from truthtelling can be avoided by
rewarding defection in early periods. For instance, we can implement full surplus
extraction by a seller as long as there are at least two periods, while full surplus
extraction is not implementable in static problems (see Example 1).
21Indeed, Theorem 1 also remains true if we adopt a different criterion than the discounting criterion
to evaluate streams of payoff, e.g., the overtaking criterion or the limit of the means criterion (naturally,
with a modification in the definition of dynamic monotonicity to account for these changes).
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Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of all our results and the reduced strategic-form
games associated with Example 1.
Example 1: The Strategic-form Games. Conditional on a realized first-period
quality, the buyer and the seller have 64 strategies each. An agent is active at the
initial history as well as at the histories (θH , θH) and (θL, θL). At the initial history,
the agent has 4 actions. At histories (θH , θH) and (θL, θL), an agent has 2 actions for
each realization of the second-period quality. All strategies where an agent plays NθL
in the first-period are payoff equivalent (there are 16 strategies of that form). Similarly,
for all strategies where an agent plays NθH in the first-period. We write NθL and NθH
for those strategies. If the first-period reports do not match, then the game essentially
ends. Thus, all strategies where an agent reports θL at the initial history, reports
θL at the history (θL, θL) conditional on second-period quality θL, reports θL at the
history (θL, θL) conditional on second-period quality θH are payoff-equivalent. We write
θLθLθL for those strategies. Similarly, for all other strategies. For instance, θHθHθL
represents all strategies where an agent reports θH at the initial history, reports θH
at the history (θH , θH) conditional on second-period quality θL and reports θL at the
history (θH , θH) conditional on second-period quality θH . Each reduced strategic-form
game has therefore 10 “strategies.” Tables 6 and 7 represent the two reduced strategic-
form games associated with each first-period quality θL and θH . The buyer is the row
player, while the seller is the column player. In each cell, the top payoff is the buyer’s
payoff, while the bottom payoff is the seller’s payoff.
Throughout the proofs, we use the following observation. For any deception p˜i ∈ ΠT
and state history θ˜T ∈ ΘT such that for all i ∈ I and t ∈ T , Lfi,t(f(p˜it(θ˜t, θ˜t)), p˜it(θ˜t, θ˜t)) ⊆
Lfp˜i
i,θ˜t
(f(p˜it(θ˜
t, θ˜t), θ˜t), there exists a deception pi ∈ ΠT such that for all i ∈ I, t ∈ T and,
importantly, for all (θt, θt) ∈ Θt×Θ, Lfi,t(f(pit(θt, θt)), pit(θt, θt)) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(pit(θt, θt), θt).
The deception pi agrees with p˜i at θ˜T and with pi∗ at all other state histories. Thus, if f
is dynamic monotonic, then f(pit(θ
t, θt)) = f(θt) for all t ∈ T and (θt, θt) ∈ Θt×Θ. As
the converse is also true, we have an equivalent formulation of dynamic monotonicity.
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θLθLθH θLθLθL θLθHθL θLθHθH NθL θHθLθH θHθLθL θHθHθL θHθHθH NθH
θLθLθH
0 0 0 0 δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1)
10 + 12δ 10 + 5δ 10 10 + 7δ 10 + 11δ 1 1 1 1 1
θLθLθL
0 δu(4)
2
δu(4)
2
0 δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1)
10 + 5δ 10 + 10δ 10 + 5δ 10 10 + 11δ 1 1 1 1 1
θLθHθL
0 δu(4)
2
δu(4)+δu(−4)
2
δu(−4)
2
δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1)
10 10 + 5δ 10 + 12δ 10 + 7δ 10 + 11δ 1 1 1 1 1
θLθHθH
0 0 δu(−4)
2
δu(−4)
2
δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1)
10 + 7δ 10 10 + 7δ 10 + 14δ 10 + 11δ 1 1 1 1 1
NθL
u(−4) + δu(y) u(−4) + δu(y) u(−4) + δu(y) u(−4) + δu(y) (2+δ)u(−4)
2
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) (2+δ)u(10)+δu(14)
2
10 10 10 10 14 + 14δ 1 1 1 1 0
θHθLθH
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−4) u(−4) u(−4) u(−4) 2u(−4)+δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
1 1 1 1 1 14 + 12δ 14 + 5δ 14 14 + 7δ 14 + 11δ
θHθLθL
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−4) 2u(−4)+δu(4)
2
2u(−4)+δu(4)
2
u(−4) 2u(−4)+δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
1 1 1 1 1 14 + 5δ 14 + 10δ 14 + 5δ 14 14 + 11δ
θHθHθL
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−4) 2u(−4)+δu(4)
2
(2+δ)u(−4)+δu(4)
2
(2+δ)u(−4)
2
2u(−4)+δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
1 1 1 1 1 14 14 + 5δ 14 + 12δ 14 + 7δ 14 + 11δ
θHθHθH
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−4) u(−4) (2+δ)u(−4)
2
(2+δ)u(−4)
2
2u(−4)+δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
1 1 1 1 1 14 + 7δ 14 14 + 7δ 14 + 14δ 14 + 11δ
NθH
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) (2+δ)u(10)+δu(14)
2
u(−4) u(−4) u(−4) u(−4) (2+δ)u(−4)
2
1 1 1 1 0 10 10 10 10 14 + 14δ
Table 6: The reduced strategic-form game: first-period quality θL.
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θLθLθH θLθLθL θLθHθL θLθHθH NθL θHθLθH θHθLθL θHθHθL θHθHθH NθH
θLθLθH
u(4) u(4) u(4) u(4) 2u(4)+δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1)
10 + 12δ 10 + 5δ 10 10 + 7δ 10 + 11δ 1 1 1 1 1
θLθLθL
u(4) (2+δ)u(4)
2
(2+δ)u(4)
2
u(4) 2u(4)+δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1)
10 + 5δ 10 + 10δ 10 + 5δ 10 10 + 11δ 1 1 1 1 1
θLθHθL
u(4) (2+δ)u(4)
2
(2+δ)u(4)+δu(−4)
2
2u(4)+δu(−4)
2
2u(4)+δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1)
10 10 + 5δ 10 + 12δ 10 + 7δ 10 + 11δ 1 1 1 1 1
θLθHθH
u(4) u(4) 2u(4)+δu(−4)
2
2u(4)+δu(−4)
2
2u(4)+δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1)
10 + 7δ 10 10 + 7δ 10 + 14δ 10 + 11δ 1 1 1 1 1
NθL
δu(y) δu(y) δu(y) δu(y) δu(−4)
2
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) (2+δ)u(14)+δu(10)
2
10 10 10 10 14 + 14δ 1 1 1 1 0
θHθLθH
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) 0 0 0 0 δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
1 1 1 1 1 14 + 12δ 14 + 5δ 14 14 + 7δ 14 + 11δ
θHθLθL
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) 0 δu(4)
2
δu(4)
2
0 δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
1 1 1 1 1 14 + 5δ 14 + 10δ 14 + 5δ 14 14 + 11δ
θHθHθL
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) 0 δu(4)
2
δu(−4)+δu(4)
2
δu(−4)
2
δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
1 1 1 1 1 14 14 + 5δ 14 + 12δ 14 + 7δ 14 + 11δ
θHθHθH
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) 0 0 δu(−4)
2
δu(−4)
2
δu(−1)+δu(3)
2
1 1 1 1 1 14 + 7δ 14 14 + 7δ 14 + 14δ 14 + 11δ
NθH
u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) u(−1) (2+δ)u(14)+δu(10)
2
0 0 0 0 δu(−4)
2
1 1 1 1 0 10 10 10 10 14 + 14δ
Table 7: The reduced strategic-form game: first-period quality θH .
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Proof of Remark 1 Note that since f is strictly efficient in the range, for each v ∈
co(V (f)) such that v 6= vf = (vfi )i∈I , there exists i∗ ∈ I such that vi∗ < vfi∗ . Moreover,
since v =
∑
f ′∈F(f) α
f ′vf
′
with
∑
f ′∈F(f) α
f ′ = 1 and αf
′ ≥ 0 for all f ′ ∈ F(f), it follows
from strict efficiency of f and the fact that vf is an extreme point of co(V (f)) that
αf = 1 whenever v = vf , i.e., v corresponds to the implementation of f . Consequently,
for any deception pi such that pit(θ
t, θ∗t ) = θt 6= θ∗t , vfpi ∈ co(V (f)) and vfpi 6= vf .
Therefore, for some i∗ we have vfpii∗ < v
f
i∗ and hence (f(θt), v
f
i∗) ∈ Lfi∗,t(f(θt), θt), but
(f(θt), v
f
i∗) /∈ Lfpii∗,θt(f(θt), θ∗t ). 
Proof of Remark 2 Suppose that f is Maskin monotonic and assume that there
exists a deception pi such that for all t ∈ T , for all θt ∈ Θt, for all pairs (θt, θ∗t ) with
pit(θ
t, θ∗t ) = θt, we have L
f
i,t(f(θt), θt) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ∗t ) for all i ∈ I. We need to show
that f(θ∗t ) = f (θt) for all θ
t ∈ Θt, for all t ∈ T . The argument is by induction.
Consider the last period T , any θT and pairs (θT , θ
∗
T ) with piT (θ
T , θ∗T ) = θT . Since
Vi(T ) = {0}, the nestedness of the dynamic lower contour sets, i.e., Lfi,θT (f(θT ), θT ) ⊆
Lfpi
i,θT
(f(θT ), θ
∗
T ), is equivalent to the nestedness of the static lower contour sets, i.e.,
Li(f(θT ), θT ) ⊆ Li(f(θT ), θ∗T ). From Maskin monotonicity, it follows that f(θ∗T ) =
f(θT ), as required. To complete the induction argument, consider period t < T and
suppose that for all τ > t, for all θτ , for all (θτ , θ
∗
τ ) ∈ Θ × Θ, and for all deceptions
pi such that piτ (θ
τ , θ∗τ ) = θτ , we have that f(θ
∗
τ ) = f (θτ ). It follows that in period t
the continuation payoff vfpii (θ
t, θt) is equal to v
f
i (t) for all agents i, for all (θ
t, θt) and,
thus, Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ
∗
t ) = L
f
i,t(f(θt), θ
∗
t ) for all (θ
t, θt, θ
∗
t ). As a result, L
f
i,t(f(θt), θt) ⊆
Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ
∗
t ) is equivalent to L
f
i,t(f(θt), θt) ⊆ Lfi,t(f(θt), θ∗t ). In turn, this is equivalent
to the nestedness of the static lower contour sets, i.e., Li(f(θt), θt) ⊆ Li(f(θt), θ∗t ).
Maskin monotonicity then implies f(θ∗t ) = f(θt). This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Remark 3 Assume to the contrary that f is dynamic monotonic but
not weakly efficient in the range; that is, there exists ε > 0 and a payoff profile
(vi)i∈I ∈ co(V (f)) such that vi > vfi + 2ε for all i ∈ I. Using a standard argu-
ment about convexifying the set of payoffs without public randomization (e.g., see
Lemma 3.7.2 in Mailath and Samuelson, 2006), it follows that there exists δH2 such
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that for all δ ∈ (δH2 , 1) there exists an infinite sequence of social choice functions
{f1, f2, ...} with ft ∈ F (f) for all integers t (i.e., the range of ft is a subset of
the range of f), and (1− δ)∑∞τ=t δτ−tvfτi > vi − ε, for all i ∈ I, for all t. Since
ft ∈ F (f), there exist mappings pi′t : Θ → Θ such that f ◦ pi′t = ft. Consider
the deception pi such that pit(θ
t, θ∗t ) = pi
′
t(θ
∗
t ) for all θ
∗
t , for all θ
t, for all t. It fol-
lows that vfpii (θ
t, θ∗t ) = (1− δ)
∑∞
τ=t+1 δ
τ−t−1vfτi > vi − ε > vfi + ε for all i. Let
ρ = maxi∈I,θ,θ∗∈Θ |ui (f (θ) , θ)− ui (f (θ) , θ∗)| , and let δH = max( ρρ+ε , δH2). Then, for
δ ∈ (δH , 1), for all i, for all pairs (θt, θ∗t ) with pit(θt, θ∗t ) = θt, for all θt ∈ Θt, for
all t ∈ T , it is (1− δ)ui (f (θt) , θ∗t ) + δvfpii (θt, θ∗t ) ≥ (1− δ)ui (f (θt) , θt) + δvfi , or,
equivalently, Lfi,t(f(θt), θt) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ∗t ). Dynamic monotonicity then implies that
f ◦ pi′t = ft = f for all t, contradicting the assumed weak inefficiency of f . 
Proof of Remark 4 Assume f is Maskin monotonic and efficient in the range, and
suppose that there exists a deception pi such that for all t ∈ T , for all θt ∈ Θt, for all
pairs (θt, θ
∗
t ) with pit(θ
t, θ∗t ) = θt, we have L
f
i,t(f(θt), θt) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ∗t ) for all i ∈ I.
Recall that vfpii (θ
t, θt) is the (normalized) expected discounted continuation payoff of
agent i from following the deception pi from the history induced by pi and (θt, θt).
Thus, vfpii (θ
t, θt) is an element of the convex hull of V (f), the set of payoff profiles
of social choice functions with a range contained in the range of f . First, suppose
that (vfpii (θ
t, θt))i∈I 6= (vfi )i∈I . Since f is efficient in the range, it follows that there
exists an agent i∗ such that vfpii∗ (θ
t, θt) < v
f
i∗ . Consequently, we have that (f(θt), v
f
i∗) ∈
Lfi∗,t(f(θt), θt) (by definition) and (f(θt), v
f
i∗) /∈ Lfpii∗,θt(f(θt), θ∗t ), a contradiction. So,
it must be that vfpii (θ
t, θt) = v
f
i for all i ∈ I. It then immediately follows that the
nestedness of the dynamic lower contour sets (i.e., Lfi,t(f(θt), θt) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ∗t ))
implies the nestdeness of the static lower contour sets (i.e., Li(f(θt), θt) ⊆ Li(f(θt), θ∗t )).
Maskin monotonicity then implies that f (θ∗t ) = f (θt). This shows that f(pit(θ
t, ·)) = f
for all θt ∈ Θt, for all t ∈ T , and hence f must be dynamic monotonic. 
Proof of Remark 6 By contradiction, suppose that f is dynamic monotonic over
T periods, but not over T + 1 periods. Since f is not dynamic monotonic over T + 1
periods, there exist a profile of states θT+1 ∈ ΘT+1 and a deception pi ∈ ΠT+1 with
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f(pit(θ
t, θt)) 6= f(θt) for at least one t ∈ {1, . . . , T+1}, while the dynamic lower contour
sets are nested, i.e., for all i ∈ I, for all t ∈ T ,
Lfi,t(f(pit(θ
t, θt)), pit(θ
t, θt)) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(pit(θt, θt)), θt). (2)
We first argue that f(pit(θ
t, θt)) = f(θt) for all t ∈ {2, . . . , T + 1}. Fix the first
period state θ1 in the profile θ
T+1 and consider any deception pi∗∗ ∈ ΠT such that
pi∗∗t (θ
t, θt) = pit+1((θ1, θ
t), θt) for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. In words, pi∗∗ mirrors the last T
periods of pi, given that the first period state was θ1.
By (2) and βt,T = βt+1,T+1, for all i ∈ I and t ∈ {1, ..., T},
Lfi,t(f(pi
∗∗
t (θ
t, θt)), pi
∗∗
t (θ
t, θt)) ⊆ Lfpi∗∗i,θt (f(pi∗∗t (θt, θt)), θt).
Since f is dynamic monotonic over T periods, this implies that f(pi∗∗t (θ
t, θt)) = f(θt)
for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T} or, equivalently, f(pit(θt, θt)) = f(θt) for all t ∈ {2, . . . , T + 1}. It
follows that vfpii ((θ
t, θt)) = v
fpi∗∗
i ((θ
t, θt)) = v
f
i (t) for all t ≥ 1.
Therefore, we must have f(pi1(θ1)) 6= f(θ1). We now argue that this cannot be the
case either. Consider any deception pi◦ such that pi◦t (θ
t, θt) = pit(θ
t, θt) for all (θ
t, θt),
that is, pi◦ coincides with the first T periods of pi.
Since f is dynamic monotonic over T periods (and the fact that f(pi◦1(θ1)) 6= f(θ1)),
there exist i ∈ I, t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and (x, vi) such that
(1− βt,T )ui(f(pi◦t (θt, θt)), pi◦t (θt, θt)) + βt,Tvfi (t) ≥ (1− βt,T )ui(x, pi◦t (θt, θt)) + βt,Tvi,
and
(1− βt,T )ui(f(pi◦t (θt, θt)), θt) + βt,Tvfi (t) < (1− βt,T )ui(x, θt) + βt,Tvi.
Using the definition of pi◦, this is equivalent to (remember that βt,T+1 ∈ (0, 1)):
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(1− βt,T+1)
[
ui
(
f
(
pit(θ
t, θt)
)
, pit(θ
t, θt)
)− ui (x, pit(θt, θt)) ] ≥ βt,T
1− βt,T (1− βt,T+1)[vi − v
f
i (t)]
> (1− βt,T+1)
[
ui
(
f
(
pit(θ
t, θt)
)
, θt
)− ui(x, θt)] .
Let vˆi be given by
βt,T
1− βt,T
1− βt,T+1
βt,T+1
vi +
(
1− βt,T
1− βt,T
1− βt,T+1
βt,T+1
)
vfi (t).
Since βt,T ≤ βt,T+1, we have that vˆi ∈ [vi, vi]. It follows that there exists (x, vˆi) ∈
X × Vi(t) such that
(1−βt,T+1)ui
(
f
(
pit(θ
t, θt)
)
, pit(θ
t, θt)
)
+βt,T+1v
f
i (t) ≥ (1−βt,T+1)ui
(
x, pit(θ
t, θt)
)
+βt,T+1vˆi,
and
(1− βt,T+1)ui
(
f(pit(θ
t, θt), θt
)
+ βt,T+1v
f
i (t) < (1− βt,T+1)ui(x, θt) + βt,T+1vˆi.
This is equivalent to Lfi,t(f(pit(θ
t, θt)), pit(θ
t, θt)) * Lfpii,θt(f(pit(θ
t, θt)), θt), a contradiction
with (2). Therefore, f(pi1(θ1)) = f(θ1), as required. 
Proof of Theorem 1 Suppose that f is repeatedly implementable by the dynamic
mechanism regime r. Fix an equilibrium s. Consider a history ht and a mechanismGt =
〈MGt , gt〉 having positive probability of occurring on the equilibrium path at period t;
that is, such that q(ht; s) > 0 and r(Gt;h
t) > 0. Since the dynamic regime r implements
f , the profile of actions s(ht, Gt, θt) at period t must satisfy gt(s(h
t, Gt, θt)) = f(θt)
for each θt ∈ Θ, and the continuation payoff must be vfi (t). Let Qi (ht, Gt, θt; s) be
the set of current alternative and continuation payoff pairs that agent i is able to
generate by any deviation starting at t, given that all other agents follow s. Formally,
(x, vi) ∈ X × Vi(t) belongs to Qi (ht, Gt, θt; s) if there exists mi ∈ MGti such that
x = g(mi, s−i(ht, Gt, θt)) and there exists vi ∈ Vi(t) which corresponds to i’s expected
33
discounted continuation payoff when (starting at t, in state θt, after history h
t) agent
i follows some continuation strategy (which prescribes sending message mi at t), while
all other agents continue to follow s−i.
Since s is an equilibrium, for each i ∈ I, for each θt ∈ Θ, we must have that
(1− βt,T )ui(f(θt), θt) + βt,Tvfi (t) ≥ (1− βt,T )ui(x, θt) + βt,Tvi,
for each (x, vi) ∈ Qi (ht, Gt, θt; s). Consequently, it must beQi (ht, Gt, θt; s) ⊆ Lfi,t(f(θt), θt)
for all ht, θt and Gt such that q(h
t; s) > 0 and r(Gt;h
t) > 0.
Now consider a deception pi such that for all t ∈ T , for all θt ∈ Θt, for all pairs
(θt, θ
∗
t ) with pit(θ
t, θ∗t ) = θt, we have L
f
i,t(f(θt), θt) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ∗t ) for all i ∈ I. In the
remainder of the proof, we will show that there exists an equilibrium s′ that implements
the social choice function f(pit(θ
t, ·)) at each period t, for each θt. Since the regime r
repeatedly implements f , it must be that f(pit(θ
t, ·)) = f for all θt ∈ Θt, for all t ∈ T .
Hence, we may conclude that f is dynamic monotonic and the theorem holds.
We now construct the strategy profile s′. First, consider the equilibrium path. Let
h1 = h1pi = {∅} and for all θ1, for all G1, for all i, define
s′i(h
1, G1, θ1) = si(h
1
pi, G1, pi1(θ1)).
Then assume that the strategy profile s′ and the histories hτ and hτpi have been defined
up to period τ = t. Let ht+1 = (ht, Gt, θt, s
′(ht, Gt, θt)), with ht = (htD, θ
t), be a period
t + 1 history corresponding to the history of realized states θt. Associate the history
ht+1 with ht+1pi = (h
t
pi, Gt, pit(θ
t, θt), s(h
t
pi, Gt, pit(θ
t, θt)), and for all θt+1, for all Gt+1, for
all i, define
s′i(h
t+1, Gt+1, θt+1) = si(h
t+1
pi , Gt+1, pit+1((θ
t, θt), θt+1)).
This concludes the definition of s′ on the equilibrium path. Note that it prescribes
that agents behave as s would prescribe if the history of realized states were the one
described by the deception pi, instead of the true history.
We now define s′ when agent i unilaterally deviates from the equilibrium path
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at period t, history ht = (htD, θ
t) and state θt. The history induced by deviating to
mi,t 6= s′i(ht, Gt, θt) is ht+1|mi,t = (ht, Gt, θt, (mi,t, s′−i(ht, Gt, θt))). Associate ht+1|mi,t
with ht+1pi |mi,t = (htpi, Gt, pit(θt, θt), (mi,t, s−i(htpi, Gt, pit(θt, θt))). For all θt+1, for all Gt+1,
for all i, define
s′i(h
t+1|mi,t , Gt+1, θt+1) = si(ht+1pi |mi,t , Gt+1, θt+1).
Decompose history ht+τ into the history up to t+ 1, ht+1, and the history after t+ 1,
ht+1,t+τ , and write ht+τ = (ht+1, ht+1,t+τ ). For all τ ≥ 2, for all histories ht+τ =(
ht+1|mi,t , ht+1,t+τ
)
, define
s′i((h
t+1|mi,t , ht+1,t+τ ), Gt+τ , θt+τ ) = si((ht+1pi |mi,t , ht+1,t+τ ), Gt+τ , θt+τ ),
for all θt+τ , for all Gt+τ , for all i. Finally, assume that s
′ agrees with s at all other
histories. Note that s′ prescribes that following the deviation by agent i, starting from
period t+ 1, agents revert to the original equilibrium strategy profile s.
By construction of s′, for any t, any θt, and any θ∗t , the expected payoff of agent i
at state θ∗t from period t onwards is
(1− βt,T )ui(f(pit(θt, θ∗t )), θ∗t ) + βt,Tvfpii (θt, θ∗t ).
In addition, if agent i deviates from s′ at history ((htD, θ
t), Gt, θ
∗
t ) by announcing
mi,t, the alternative implemented is x satisfying
x = g(mi,t, s
′
−i((h
t
D, θ
t), Gt, θ
∗
t )) = g(mi,t, s−i(h
t
pi, Gt, pit(θ
t, θ∗t )),
and i ’s continuation payoff vi must satisfy (x, vi) ∈ Qi (htpi, Gt, θt; s), where θt =
pit(θ
t, θ∗t ). Thus, if agent i has a profitable deviation, there exist an alternative x
and a continuation payoff vi such that (x, vi) ∈ Qi (htpi, Gt, θt; s) and
(1− βt,T )ui(x, θ∗t ) + βt,Tvi > (1− βt,T )ui(f(pit(θt, θ∗t )), θ∗t ) + βt,Tvfpii (θt, θ∗t ),
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or, since f(pit(θ
t, θ∗t ) = f(θt), (x, vi) 6∈ Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ∗t ).
By construction, the t-period deviation by i is feasible under strategy profile s when
the state is θt = pit(θ
t, θ∗t ) and the history is h
t
pi. Since, by assumption, L
f
i,t(f(θt), θt) ⊆
Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ
∗
t ), it must be (x, vi) 6∈ Lfi,t(f(θt), θt) and hence the deviation from s at t is
profitable. This contradicts the assumption that s is an equilibrium. Hence, it cannot
be (x, vi) ∈ Qi (htpi, Gt, θt; s) and (x, vi) 6∈ Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ∗t ); it must be Qi (htpi, Gt, θt; s) ⊆
Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ
∗
t ). It follows that s
′ is an equilibrium (no agent has a profitable deviation
at any point in time). Since the mechanism regime r repeatedly implements f , it must
therefore be that f(pit(θ
t, ·)) = f for all θt ∈ Θt, for all t ∈ T . This concludes the proof
of the necessity of dynamic monotonicity. 
Proof of Theorem 2 Assume that the social choice function f is dynamic mono-
tonic and satisfies no-veto power. We show that f is repeatedly implementable.
Step 1: Static Mechanisms . We present several static mechanisms.
♦ The period t canonical mechanism, G∗t = 〈M∗t , g∗t 〉.
Let N be the set of non-negative integers. For each i ∈ I, the message space of
agent i is M∗t,i = Θ ×X × Vi(t) × N, with mt,i = (θt,i, xt,i, vt,i, nt,i) a generic element.
The allocation rule g∗t is defined as follows:
Rule 1 : If mt,i = (θt, f(θt), v
f
i (t), 0) for each i ∈ I, then g∗t (mt,1, . . . ,mt,I) = f(θt).
Rule 2 : If there exists j such that mt,i = (θt, f(θt), v
f
i (t), 0) for each i ∈ I \ {j}
and mt,j = (θt,j, xt,j, vt,j, nt,j) 6= (θt, f(θt), vfj (t), 0), then g∗t (mt,1, . . . ,mt,I) = xt,j if
(xt,j, vt,j) ∈ Lfj,t (f(θt), θt), and g∗t (mt,1, . . . ,mt,I) = f(θt), otherwise.
Rule 3 : If neither rule 1 nor rule 2 apply, then g∗t (mt,1, . . . ,mt,I) = xt,i∗ with i
∗ =
min{i ∈ I : nt,i ≥ nt,j for all j ∈ I}.
♦ Agent i’ s dictatorship, Di = 〈MDi , gDi〉.
The agents’ message spaces are MDii = X and M
Di
j = {∅} for j ∈ I \ {i}. The
allocation rule is gDi(mi,m−i) = mi.
♦ The “punishment” mechanism, Pi = 〈MPi , gPi〉.
The message space is MPij = X for all j ∈ I. If for all j ∈ I∗ with |I∗| ≥ n−1, mj =
x, then the allocation rule is gPi((mj)j∈I) = x; otherwise, gPi((mj)j∈I) = mi+1 (mod I).
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Step 2: The Dynamic Mechanism Regime r. We define the transition probability
r (Gt, h
t
D) that, after the designer history h
t
D, the mechanism in period t is Gt.
Period 1:
At the initial history, the mechanism is G∗1; that is, r(G
∗
1; ∅) = 1.
Period t:
(A) Suppose that the history at period t is htD = (h
t−1
D , G
∗
t−1, (mt−1,i)i∈I) (i.e., the
mechanism was G∗t−1 in period t− 1). The transition to period t is as follows:
- If mt−1,i = (θt−1, f(θt−1), v
f
i (t − 1), 0) for each i ∈ I and some θt−1 ∈ Θ, then
r(G∗t ;h
t
D) = 1. In words, if rule 1 of G
∗
t−1 applied in period t− 1, then in period
t the mechanism is G∗t with probability one.
- If there exists j such that mt−1,i = (θt−1, f(θt−1), v
f
i (t − 1), 0) for each i ∈ I \
{j} and mt−1,j = (θt−1,j, xt−1,j, vt−1,j, nt−1,j) 6= (θt−1, f(θt−1), vfj (t − 1), 0), then
r (Pj;h
t
D) = (1 − λ(t)j ) and r (Dj;htD) = λ(t)j . In words, if rule 2 of G∗t−1 applied
in period t − 1 with j as the odd-man-out, then the mechanism in period t is
the “punishment” mechanism Pj with probability (1 − λ(t)j ) and the dictatorial
mechanism Dj with probability λ
(t)
j (to be defined later). As we shall see in (B)
and (C ), once either Pj or Dj is selected at t, it is adopted in all future periods.
- If any other profile of messages is played in period t − 1, then r(Di∗ ;htD) = 1;
that is, the period t mechanism is Di∗ with i
∗ the lowest-indexed agent having
announced the highest integer in period t− 1.
(B) If the designer history at period t is htD = (h
t−1
D , Dj, (mt−1,i)i∈I) (i.e., the
mechanism at period t− 1 was Dj), then r(Dj;htD) = 1.
(C ) If the designer history at period t is htD = (h
t−1
D , Pj, (mt−1,i)i∈I) (i.e., the
mechanism at period t− 1 was Pj), then r(Pj;htD) = 1.
Step 3: Definition of λ
(t)
j , t ∈ T \ {1}. We only need to define λ(t)j when rule 2 of
G∗t−1 applied at t − 1 and j was the odd-man-out. Let (xt−1,j, vt−1,j) be the pair of
alternative and continuation payoff announced by j in period t− 1. Recall that vj and
vj are the lowest and highest expected payoffs agent j can obtain. If vj = vj, we may
choose any λ
(t)
j ∈ [0, 1]. If vj > vj, define λ(t)j ∈ [0, 1] as the unique solution of
vt−1,j = λ
(t)
j vj +
(
1− λ(t)j
)
vj,
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if (xt−1,j, vt−1,j) ∈ Lfj,t (f (θt−1) , θt−1), and otherwise as the unique solution of
vfj = λ
(t)
j vj +
(
1− λ(t)j
)
vj.
Step 4: Existence of an Equilibrium. There exists an equilibrium sE that repeat-
edly implements f .
For each agent i, the strategy sEi is defined as follows:
1. For all θ1 ∈ Θ, sEi (∅, G∗1, θ1) = (θ1, f(θ1), vfi (1), 0).
2. For all θt ∈ Θ, if ht is such that for all τ < t: (i) Gτ = G∗τ and (ii) mτ =
(θτ , f(θτ ), v
f
i (τ), 0)i∈I for some θτ ∈ Θ, then sEi (ht, G∗t , θt) = (θt, f(θt), vfi (t), 0).
3. For all ht ∈ H, all θt ∈ Θ and all i ∈ I, sEi (ht, Pj, θt) = xθtj , where xθtj ∈
arg minx∈X uj(x, θt).
4. For all ht ∈ H and all θt ∈ Θ, sEi (ht, Dj, θt) = ∅ if i 6= j, and sEj (ht, Dj, θt) = xθtj ,
with xθtj ∈ arg maxx∈X uj(x, θt).
According to sEi , in the first period, each agent i announces (θ1, f(θ1), v
f
i (1), 0),
whenever θ1 is the true state. In period t > 1, there are three cases. First, if
the game being played is G∗t and all agents have made “unanimous” announcements
(θτ , f(θτ ), v
f
i (τ), 0) in all past periods τ < t, then agent i announces (θt, f(θt), v
f
i (t), 0),
whenever θt is the true state in period t. Second, if the game being played is Pj, then
all agents announce an alternative that “min-max” agent j. Third, if the game being
played is Dj, then agent j chooses an alternative that maximizes his period t payoff.
Under sE, agent j’s expected payoff at period t when the state is θt is
(1− βt,T )uj(f(θt), θt) + βt,Tvfj (t).
If agent j deviates and announces (θt,j, xt,j, vt,j, nt,j) 6= (θt, f(θt), vfj (t), 0), the high-
est possible payoff following the deviation is
min
{
(1− βt,T )uj(xt,j, θt) + βt,Tvt,j, (1− βt,T )uj(f(θt), θt) + βt,Tvfj (t)
}
,
so that agent j has no profitable deviation. Note that agent j obtains a continuation
payoff of vt,j if, following the deviation, he announces xτ,j ∈ arg maxx∈X ui(x, θτ ) for
all τ > t, for all θτ ∈ Θ, whenever he is dictatorial.
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Step 5: No Undesirable Equilibria. There are no undesirable equilibria.
Let s be any equilibrium and consider any history ht with q(ht; s) > 0. We want to
show that (i) g(s(ht, G∗t , θt)) = f(θt) for all θt ∈ Θ if r(G∗t ;ht) > 0, (ii) g(s(ht, Di, θt)) =
f(θt) for all θt ∈ Θ if r(Di;ht) > 0, and (iii) g(s(ht, Pi, θt)) = f(θt) for all θt ∈ Θ if
r(Pi;h
t) > 0.
Statements (ii) and (iii) follow from no-veto power. If Gi ∈ {Di, Pi} is adopted
in period t with positive probability, then there was a last time t′ < t when G∗t′ was
played and either rule 2 with agent i the odd-man-out, or rule 3 with i the dictator,
applied. Every agent j other than agent i could have deviated and become the dictator
at t′ and in all future periods. For such a deviation not to be profitable it must be the
case that the alternative implemented at t and state θt is x ∈ maxθtj X for all j 6= i.
No-veto power then implies x = f (θt), as statements (ii) and (iii) claim.
22
Now consider statement (i). Assume that r(G∗t ;h
t) > 0.
Claim 1 : If the equilibrium s is such that s(ht, G∗t , θt) corresponds to rule 2 of
G∗t , i.e., si(h
t, G∗t , θt) = (θ˜t, f(θ˜t), v
f
i (t), 0) for each i ∈ I \ {j} and sj(ht, G∗t , θt) =
(θt,j, xt,j, vt,j, nt,j) 6= (θ˜t, f(θ˜t), vfi (t), 0), then the alternative implemented at θt is f(θt).
Proof of Claim 1 : Let x be the alternative implemented. Note that since rule 2
of G∗t applies, x is either xt,j or f(θ˜t). At the history (h
t, G∗t , θt), any agent i 6= j can
deviate and announce (θt,i, x
θt
i , vt,i, nt,i), with nt,i > nt,j, x
θt
i ∈ maxθti X, and then choose
22 To prove that (ii) and (iii) hold under Assumption A in place of no-veto power, first consider
the case when rule 2 applies in period t′. Since each agent j other than i can deviate at t′ and
become dictator in all subsequent periods τ including t (and also at t′), for rule 2 at t′ to be part of
an equilibrium it must be that on the equilibrium path in all periods τ > t′ and in all states θ the
alternative chosen maximizes the payoff of each agent j 6= i; that is, it must belong to ∩j 6=i maxθj X.
Write ϕt′(τ, θ) for the alternative implemented at τ in state θ if the mechanism is Pi, and ϕt′(τ, θ)
if the mechanism is Di. Clearly, it must be ϕt′(τ, θ) ∈ maxθi X for all τ > t′, for all θ. Let the
second and third element of the message sent by agent i at t′ on the equilibrium path be (x, vi(t′));
at t′ agent i must not have a profitable deviation (y, vi) ∈ Li,t′ (f(θt′), θt′), where θt′ is the state
announced by all agents other than i. The most severe punishment that the other agents could use
when mechanism Pi is played at t > t
′ after a deviation yields agent i a continuation payoff vi;
the highest payoff that agent i could secure himself after a deviation when mechanism Di is played
at t > t′ is vi. Since λ(vi(t′)) is the probability that Di is played on the equilibrium path and
λ(vi) the probability Di is played after the deviation, for the equilibrium under rule 2 at t
′ to exists
it must be: βt′,Tui(x, θ
∗
t′) + (1 − βt′,T )
[
λ (vi(t
′)) vϕt′i + (1− λ (vi(t′))) vϕt′i
]
≥ βt′,Tui(y, θ∗t′) + (1 −
βt′,T ) [λ (vi) vi + (1− λ (vi)) vi] = βt′,Tui(y, θ∗t′) + (1 − βt′,T )vi for all (y, vi) ∈ Li,t′ (f(θt′ , θt′), where
θt′ is the state reported by all agents other than i and θ
∗
t′ the true state at t
′. The result follows from
(i) of Assumption A, since λ(vi(t
′)) 6= 0 implies ϕt′(τ, θ) ∈ ∩j maxθj X for all θ ∈ Θ, τ > t′.
Second, if rule 3 applies at t′, the result immediately follows from condition (ii) of Assumption A.
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xθτi ∈ maxθτi X when the mechanism Di is played in period τ and θτ is the realized
state, for any τ > t. Since agent i becomes dictator for all τ ≥ t, the expected payoff
starting at t from such a deviation is: (1− βt,T )ui(xθti , θt) + βt,Tvi. For the deviation
not to be profitable, it must be that x ∈ maxθti X for all i ∈ I \ {j}. It follows from
no-veto power that x = f(θt).
23
Claim 2 : If the equilibrium s is such that s(ht, G∗t , θt) corresponds to rule 3 of G
∗
t ,
then the alternative implemented at θt is f(θt).
Proof of Claim 2 : It is analogous to the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 3 : If the equilibrium s is such that si(h
t, G∗t , θ
∗
t ) = (θt, f(θt), v
f
i (t), 0) for some
(θ∗t , θt), for each i ∈ I, then there exists a state history θt and a deception pi such
that Lfi,t(f(θt), θt) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ∗t ) for all i ∈ I with pit(θt, θ∗t ) = θt and dynamic
monotonicity implies that the alternative implemented at θ∗t is f (θt) = f (θ
∗
t ) .
Proof of Claim 3 : Since r(G∗t ;h
t) > 0, it must be r(G∗t ;h
t) = 1 and the mechanism
G∗τ must have been played in all periods τ < t. Thus, the history h
t is uniquely
determined by the strategy s and the history of realized states θt contained in ht. Define
pit(θ
t, θ∗t ) = θt if si(h
t, G∗t , θ
∗
t ) = (θt, f(θt), v
f
i (t), 0) for each i ∈ I, and pit(θt, θ∗t ) =
θ∗t , otherwise. Now, take τ > t and consider any subsequent history h
τ of ht (i.e.,
hτ = (ht, ht,τ ) for some ht,τ ) with q(hτ ; s) > 0. There are two cases. If r(G∗τ ;h
τ ) >
0, define piτ as done at t, using the history of realized states θ
τ contained in hτ .
Alternatively, if r(G∗τ ;h
τ ) = 0, let piτ (θ
τ , θτ ) = θτ for all θτ , with θ
τ the history of
realized states contained in hτ .24 Note that the constructed deception corresponds
to the truth-telling deception pi∗τ whenever rules 2 and 3 of G
∗
τ apply or whenever
the mechanism is Pi or Di for some i ∈ I. From claims 1 and 2, f is implemented
whenever rule 2 or 3 of the mechanism G∗τ applies for any τ > t. Since f is also
implemented whenever the mechanism is Di or Pi, and recalling that f(pit(θ
t, θ∗t )) =
f(θt), it follows that the expected payoff of agent i under s when the state is θ
∗
t at
period t, is (1− βt,T )ui(f(θt), θ∗t ) + βt,Tvfpii (θt, θ∗t ).
23The proof that Claim 1 holds under Assumption A in place of no-veto power is as in footnote 22.
24To see that the deception is well-defined, observe that if there are two histories hτ and hˆτ such
that q(hτ ; r, s, p) > 0, q(hˆτ ; r, s, p) > 0, r(G∗τ ;h
τ ) > 0 and r(G∗τ ; hˆ
τ ) = 0, then it must be that the
history of realized states θτ contained in hτ is different from the history of realized states θˆτ contained
in hˆτ since hτ is uniquely determined by s and θτ .
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Now, suppose that there exists (i, xt,i, vt,i) ∈ I ×X × Vi(t) such that:
(1− βt,T )ui(xt,i, θt) + βt,Tvt,i ≤ (1− βt,T )ui(f(θt), θt) + βt,Tvfi (t), (3)
(1− βt,T )ui(xt,i, θ∗t ) + βt,Tvt,i > (1− βt,T )ui(f(θt), θ∗t ) + βt,Tvfpii (θt, θ∗t ). (4)
If agent i deviates at (ht, G∗t , θ
∗
t ) and announces (θt,i, xt,i, vt,i, nt,i) 6= (θt, f(θt), vfi (t), 0),
then from period t + 1 onwards he is dictatorial with probability λ
(t)
i and with prob-
ability (1 − λ(t)i ) the mechanism is Pi. Consequently, agent i can guarantee himself
a continuation payoff of at least vt,i = λ
(t)
i vi + (1 − λ(t)i )vi, and thus has a profitable
deviation. Therefore, for s to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that for all
(i, xt,i, vt,i) ∈ I × X × Vi(t), if (3) holds, then (4) must fail. Equivalently, it must be
Lfi,t(f(θt), θt) ⊆ Lfpii,θt(f(θt), θ∗t ). Since pit(θt, θ∗t ; ) = θt, this proves Claim 3.
Since Claims 1-3 are true for any period t, we conclude that s implements f . 
Proof of Theorem 3 We modify the canonical mechanism G∗t as follows:
Rule 1 : If mt,i = (θt, xt, vt, 0) for all i ∈ {1, 2}, then g(m) = f(θt).
Rule 2a: If mt,i = (θt,i, xt,i, vt,i, 0) and mj,t = (θt,j, xt,j, vt,j, 0) 6= mt,i, then g(m) = w.
Rule 2b: If mt,i = (θt,i, xt,i, vt,i, nt,i) with nt,i > 0 and mj,t = (θt,j, xt,j, vt,j, 0), then
g(m) = xt,i if (xt,i, vt,i) ∈ Lfi,t(f(θt,j), θt,j) and g(m) = w, otherwise.
Rule 3 : If mt,i = (θt,i, xt,i, vt,i, nt,i) and mj,t = (θt,j, xt,j, vt,j, nt,j) with nt,i > 0 and
nt,j > 0, then g(m) = xt,i∗ with i
∗ the agent with the smallest index among the agents
announcing the highest integer.
Let Pw be a mechanism that implements the outcome w, regardless of the messages.
The transition rule of the dynamic mechanism regime is:
– If the messages announced at period t are in rule 1, the next period mechanism
is the canonical mechanism with probability one.
– If the messages announced at period t are in rule 2a, then the next period mech-
anism is Pw with probability one.
– If the messages announced at period t are in rule 2b, then the next period mech-
anism is Di (where i is the agent having announced the positive integer) with
probability λ
(t)
i and P
w with probability 1− λ(t)i .
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– If the messages announced at period t are in rule 3, then the next period mech-
anism is Di∗ with probability one.
– If the mechanism at period t was Di (resp., P
w), then the next period mechanism
is Di (resp., P
w) with probability one.
As before, we compute λ
(t)
i so that (i) the expected continuation payoff is v
f
i (t) if
(xt,i, vt,i) /∈ Lfi,t(f(θt,j), θt,j), (ii) the expected continuation payoff is vt,i if (xt,i, vt,i) ∈
Lfi,t(f(θt,j), θt,j) and vt,i ≥ vwi =
∑
θ ui(w, θ)p(θ), and (iii) λi,t = 0, otherwise.
To see that f is repeatedly implementable suppose G∗t is used at t and observe that:
• There are equilibrium strategies that implements f , with an equilibrium path in
which G∗t is used and all agents “truthfully” report (θt, f(θt), v
f
i (t), 0) when the
state is θt at period t. To see this, suppose that the state is θt = θt,j and agent
i deviates to (θt,i, xt,i, vt,i, nt,i) and either nt,i = 0 or (xt,i, vt,i) 6∈ Lfi,t(f(θt,j), θt,j),
then the alternative implemented is w and i’s continuation payoff is vwi . By
construction, this is not a profitable deviation. If i deviates to (θt,i, xt,i, vt,i, nt,i)
with nt,i > 0 and (xt,i, vt,i) ∈ Lfi,t(f(θt,j), θt,j), then the alternative adopted is xt,i
and the continuation payoff is vt,i; by construction, this is also not a profitable
deviation (since j tells the truth).
• By condition (ii) of Assumption A, any equilibrium with rule 3 applying for some
t must implement f .
• Any equilibrium under rule 2b at t < T or t = T implements f . Let i be the
agent reporting nt,i > 0, θt the state reported by j 6= i and θ∗t the true state at t.
Consider t < T . First, if λ
(t)
i < 1, then with positive probability the outcome in all
future periods is w; agent j can profitably deviate to rule 3, and guarantee himself
a strictly higher continuation payoff. Second, if λ
(t)
i = 1, then i becomes a dictator
at t′ > t and selects x(θt′) ∈ maxθt′i X for all t′ > t and all θt′ , thus obtaining
the continuation payoff vi. Write ϕt(t
′, θ) for the alternative implemented at
state θ in period t′; we have that ϕt(t′, θ) ∈ maxθi X for all θ, for all t′ > t.
Observe that vϕti = vi. Let (xi,t, vi(t)) be the second and third element of the
message sent by i at t. Agent i must have no profitable deviation, hence it
must be βt,Tui(xt,i, θ
∗
t ) + (1− βt,T )vi ≥ βt,Tui(y, θ∗t ) + (1− βt,T )vi for all (y, vi) ∈
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Li,t (f(θt), θt). Agent j can also deviate and become dictator himself from period
t. For such a deviation not to be profitable, first it must be x(θt′) ∈ maxθt′j X
for all t′ > t and all θt′ (i.e., in all periods after t, the alternative implemented
ϕt(τ, θ) must therefore belong to max
θ
j X for all τ > t, for all θ); second, it must
be xt,i ∈ maxθ
∗
t
j X. The result then follows from condition (i) of Assumption A.
Consider t = T ; let the state be θ∗. It must be that xT,i ∈ maxθ∗i Li(f(θT,j), θT,j)
Since agent j may deviate and become dictator at t = T , either the deviation is
profitable, or by condition (ii) of Assumption A, xT,i = f(θ
∗).
• There are no equilibria under rule 2a. Let vwi (t) = 0 if t = T and vwi (t) =
vwi otherwise. Assume that the true state at t is θt = θ
∗ and the messages
reported are mt,i = (θt,i, xt,i, vt,i, 0) and mt,j = (θt,j, xt,j, vt,j, 0). The alternative
implemented is w and the continuation payoff vector is (vw1 , v
w
2 ). Agent i can
trigger rule 2b by announcing (θt,i, f(θt,j), v
f
i , 1). Since f(θt,j) ∈ Li(f(θt,j), θt,j),
it is the case that (f(θt,j), v
f
i ) ∈ Lfi,t(f(θt,j), θt,j). Thus, the deviation yields agent
i a discounted payoff of (1−βt,T )ui(f(θt,j), θ∗) +βt,Tvfi (t) > (1−βt,T )ui(w, θ∗) +
βt,Tv
w
i (t), and hence it is profitable.
• It follows from the arguments in the proof of Theorem 2 that if there are equilibria
under rule 1, then the dynamic lower contour sets are nested, as in the original
canonical mechanism, and f is implemented. 
Definition 4 (Dynamic Self-Selection) Let I = 2. For all t, all pairs (θt,2, θt,1) and
all θt, there exists a triple (x(θt,2, θt,1), v1(θt,2, θt,1), v2(θt,2, θt,1)) such that (x(θt,2, θt,1),
v1(θt,2, θt,1)) ∈ Lf1,t(f(θt,2), θt,2) and (x(θt,2, θt,1), v2(θt,2, θt,1)) ∈ Lf2,t(f(θt,1), θt,1).
Note that self-selection implies dynamic self-selection.
Proposition 1 Let I = 2. If a social choice function f is repeatedly implementable,
then it satisfies dynamic self-selection.
Proof Suppose that f is repeatedly implementable by the dynamic mechanism regime
r. Fix an equilibrium s. Consider any period t, any history ht and mechanism
〈MGt , gt〉 having positive probability of occurring on the equilibrium path, that is,
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such that q(ht; s) > 0 and r(Gt;h
t) > 0. The profile of actions s(ht, Gt, θˆt) must satisfy
g(s(ht, Gt, θˆt)) = f(θˆt) for each θˆt ∈ Θ, and the continuation payoff must be vfi (t).
This implies that
(1− βt,T )u1(f(θt,2), θt,2) + βt,Tvf1 (t) ≥
(1− βt,T )u1(g(s1(ht, Gt, θt,1), s2(ht, Gt, θt,2)), θt,2) + βt,Tv1(θt,2, θt,1),
where v1(θt,2, θt,1) is agent 1’s continuation payoff following the deviation, and
(1− βt,T )u2(f(θt,1), θt,1) + βt,Tvf2 (t) ≥
(1− βt,T )u2(g(s1(ht, Gt, θt,1), s2(ht, Gt, θt,2)), θt,1) + βt,Tv2(θt,2, θt,1),
where v2(θt,2, θt,1) is agent 2’s continuation payoff following the deviation. Letting
x(θt,2, θt,1) = g(s1(h
t, Gt, θt,1), s2(h
t, Gt, θt,2)) completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4 First, assume that there exists a set J of I − 1 agents
such that ∩j∈J arg maxx∈X uj(x, θ) 6= ∅ for all θ. By no-veto power, it must be that
{f(θ)} = ∩j∈J arg maxx∈X uj(x, θ) for all θ. (By no-veto power, if there exists {x, y} ⊆
∩j∈J arg maxx∈X uj(x, θ) for some θ, then f(θ) = x = y, i.e., ∩j∈J arg maxx∈X uj(x, θ)
is a singleton.) The following regime implements f . At t = 1, all agents in J an-
nounce an integer and an alternative (the remaining agent is inactive). The alternative
implemented at t = 1 is the one announced by the agent reporting the highest inte-
ger (break ties in favor of the lowest indexed agent). Moreover, the agent reporting
the highest integer is dictatorial in all subsequent periods. It is routine to verify that
this mechanism indeed implements f . In particular, by reporting a sufficiently large
integer at t = 1, each agent in J can obtain his highest payoff with arbitrarily large
probability. Therefore, it must be that the alternative implemented at each period is
in ∩j∈J arg maxx∈X uj(x, θ) for each θ, i.e., f is implemented.
Second, assume that for every set J of I−1 agents, there exists θ and (i, j) ∈ J ×J
such that arg maxx∈X ui(x, θ)∩arg maxx∈X uj(x, θ) = ∅. We make three changes to the
mechanism regime adopted in the proof of Theorem 2.
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First, if T < ∞, we replace the canonical mechanism GT for the last period T
with a slightly modified version G∗T of the static mechanism introduced by Maskin and
Sjo¨stro¨m (2002, p 274). The mechanism G∗T is as follows: Mi = Θ × X × N+ × {α :
Θ → X; (α(θ), 0) ∈ Lfi,T (f(θ), θ)}, where N+ is the set of positive integers. There are
three rules:
Rule 1 : If mj = (θ, x, 1, ·) for all j 6= i and mi = (θi, xi, 1, ·), then g(m) = f(θ).
Rule 2 : If mj = (θ, x, 1, ·) for all j 6= i and mi = (θi, xi, zi, ·) with zi > 1, then
g(m) = αi(θ).
Rule 3 : In all other cases, g(m) = xi∗ , where i
∗ is the lowest index agent among those
announcing the highest integer.
Second, by no indifference for each agent i there exist θ and yˆi such that maxx ui(x, θ) >
ui(yˆi, θ).
25 We use this and modify the dictatorial mechanism Di as follows: Mi =
X×N+, Mj = {∅} for all j 6= i, and g(xi, ni) = (1− 1ni )1xi + 1ni1yˆi ; that is, the outcome
is yˆi with probability
1
ni
and xi with the complementary probability.
Third, we modify the punishment mechanism Pi as follows: Mi = {∅}, Mj = X×N+
for all j ∈ I \{i}, and g(m) = xj∗ , where j∗ is the lowest indexed agent that announced
the highest integer. In all other aspects, the mechanism regime remains the same.
The proof that there exists an equilibrium that repeatedly implements f is essen-
tially the same as in the proof of Theorem 2; the only small change is that if G∗T is
played in the last period, and the state is θT , then all agents report (θT , f(θT ), 1, ·).
To show that there are no undesirable equilibria, begin by noting that there cannot
exist an equilibrium where a dictatorial regime Di is played with positive probability
on the equilibrium path; if there were, then agent i could always increase his expected
payoff by announcing a higher integer, a contradiction. It follows that rule 3 of G∗t for
all t < T cannot be in the support of any equilibrium. In addition, for rule 2 of G∗t ,
t < T , to be in the support of an equilibrium, it must be that λ
(t)
i = 0 with agent i the
odd-man out, i.e., the mechanism transitions to Pi with probability one when rule 2
applies. However, there exists a state θ for which the mechanism Pi has no equilibrium
(since there is a pair of agents with a non-empty message space who disagree on their
25Since p(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, it follows that ∑θ maxx ui(x, θ)p(θ) = vi > vˆi := ∑θ ui(yˆi, θ)p(θ).
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most preferred alternatives). It follows that any equilibrium of the game induced by
the regime transitions to Di or Pi with zero probability; that is, it corresponds to rule
1 of G∗t for all t < T and thus must be in pure strategies until the last period (if
T < ∞). This implies that if T < ∞, then G∗T is played with probability one on the
equilibrium path and hence the outcome at T must correspond to a (mixed strategy)
Nash equilibrium of G∗T .
As argued by Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002), in G∗T an “agent i has nothing to loose
from setting”: (i) αi(θ) equal to his favourite outcome in the lower contour set of f(θ)
at θ, (ii) xi ∈ arg maxx∈X ui(x, θ∗T ) where θ∗T is the true state, and (iii) “zi larger
than any integer announced with positive probability by any other agent.” First, this
implies that when rule 2 or rule 3 of G∗T apply at state θ
∗
T , then by no-veto power
it must be that the alternative implemented is f(θ∗T ). Second, it implies that when
rule 1 applies at θ∗T it must be that the state reported by I − 1 agents is the same,
denote it by piT (·, θ∗T ), the alternative implemented is f(piT (·, θ∗T )) and there is no
alternative in Lfi,T (f(piT (·, θ∗T )), piT (·, θ∗T )) that is preferred by agent i to f(piT (·, θ∗T ));
that is, Lfi,T (f(piT (·, θ∗T )), piT (·, θ∗T )) ⊆ Lfi,T (f(piT (·, θ∗T )), θ∗T ).26
Now consider any equilibrium σ in behavioral strategies. From the above argument,
the mechanism adopted is G∗t at any t. In addition, at all t < T , histories h
t, and states
θt, the mixed action σ(h
t, G∗t , θt) is pure and corresponds to rule 1 of G
∗
t . It follows
that we can associate with any state profile θt a unique public history htD(θ
t) over
mechanisms, messages reported and alternatives implemented. We now define the
deceptions induced by σ.
For any t < T , for any (θt, θt), we simply define the map pit(θ
t, θt) = θ
′
t, where θ
′
t
is the common state reported by at least I − 1 agents at the history (htD(θt), θt, G∗t , θt)
under σ. For any (θT , θT ), we define a distribution q(θ
T , θT ) ∈ ∆(Θ) over maps
piT (θ
T , θT ) ∈ Θ such that: (i) piT (θT , θT ) = θT , with probability q(θT , θT )[θT ] given
by the sum of σ(hTD(θ
T ), θT , G∗T , θT )[m] over all messages m such that either rule 2
or 3 apply or rule 1 applies with θT the common state reported by at least I − 1
26Hence, if we assumed Maskin monotonicity f would also be implemented at T when rule 1 applies,
but dynamic monotonicity does not imply Maskin monotonicity, as shown by Example 1.
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agents, and (ii) piT (θ
T , θT ) = θ
′
T with probability q(θ
T , θT )[θ
′
T ] given by the sum of
σ(hTD(θ
T ), θT , G∗T , θT )[m] over all messages m such that rule 1 applies with θ
′
T the com-
mon state reported by at least I − 1 agents, for all θ′T 6= θT .
We have thus defined a distribution over a set of dynamic deceptions, where decep-
tion pik, k ∈ K, has probability qk. For instance, if pik is such that pikT (θT , θT ) = θT for
all (θT , θT ), the probability q
k is ×(θT ,θT )q(θT , θT )[θT ].
The expected payoff of agent i at t < T , when the state is θ∗t and i selects the
pure strategy si in the support of σi while all other agents follow their behavioral
strategies σ−i (and hence report state pit(θt, θ∗t )), is (1− βt,T )ui(f(pit(θt, θ∗t )), θ∗t ) +
βt,T
∑
k∈K q
kv
f
pik
i (θ
t, θ∗t ). Suppose there exists (i, xt,i, vt,i) ∈ I ×X × Vi(t) such that:
(1− βt,T )ui(xt,i, pit(θt, θ∗t )) + βt,Tvt,i ≤ (1− βt,T )ui(f(pit(θt, θ∗t )), pit(θt, θ∗t )) + βt,Tvfi (t),
(5)
(1− βt,T )ui(xt,i, θ∗t ) + βt,Tvt,i > (1− βt,T )ui(f(pit(θt, θ∗t )), θ∗t ) + βt,T
∑
k∈K
qkv
f
pik
i (θ
t, θ∗t ).
(6)
If agent i deviates at (ht, G∗t , θ
∗
t ), t < T , and sends the message (θt,i, xt,i, vt,i, nt,i) 6=
(pit(θ
t, θ∗t ), f(pit(θ
t, θ∗t )), v
f
i (t), 0), then from period t+ 1 onwards he is dictatorial with
probability λ
(t)
i and with probability (1 − λ(t)i ) the mechanism is Pi. By selecting an
arbitrarily large integer when the mechanism is Di, agent i obtains at least a contin-
uation payoff arbitrarily close to vt,i = λ
(t)
i vi + (1 − λ(t)i )vi, and thus has a profitable
deviation. Hence, for σ to be an equilibrium, it must be that for all (i, xt,i, vt,i) ∈
I×X×Vi(t), if (5) holds, then (6) fails; that is, it must be Lfi,t(f(pit(θt, θ∗t )), pit(θt, θ∗t )) ⊆
L
f
pik
i,θt (f(pit(θ
t, θ∗t )), θ
∗
t ) for at least one deception pi
k, for all t < T . We have already es-
tablished that it must also be Lfi,T (f(piT (θ
T , θ∗T )), piT (θ
T , θ∗T )) ⊆ Lfi,T (f(pi(θT , θ∗T )), θ∗T ) =
L
f
pik
i,θT
(f(piT (θ
T , θ∗T )), θ
∗
T ). Dynamic monotonicity then implies f(pit(θ
t, θ∗t )) = f(θ
∗
t ) for
all t ∈ T . This concludes the proof of the theorem. 
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